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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2-2(j) of the
Utah Code.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant lists five issues which are restatements of the single issue before the
Court as set forth below. However, for the Court's convenience, Appellee's brief
responds to each section and argument raised by the Appellant in corresponding order.
Issue Presented
Where a judgment is vacated by the Court of Appeals and later reinstated by the
Supreme Court, is the priority of the judgment lien established by the date that the
judgment was reinstated, or does it relate back to the date of the original judgment?
Standard of Review
The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard, and its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Board ofEduc, v. Ward,
1999 UT 1 7 4 8, 974 P.2d 824; Pennington v. Allstate Ins, Co., 973 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1998).
STATUTES AND RULES
78-22-1.

Duration of Judgment - Judgment as Lien Upon Real Property Abstract of Judgment - Small Claims Judgment not Lien - Appeal of
Judgment - Child Support Orders [Effective Until July 1, 2002].

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (6), judgments shall continue for eight years
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance
with law.
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(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry of
judgment by a district court is a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, not
exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, located
in the county in which the judgment is entered.
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1 (Supp. 2001).
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 36, Issuance of Remittitur,
(a) Date of issuance.
(1) In the Supreme Court the remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after
the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, the remittitur
of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order disposing of the
petition.
(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or
shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of the court, any
direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall constitute the
remittitur.
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending application for review to the
Supreme Court of the United States. A stay or supersedeas of the remittitur or an
injunction pending application for review may be granted on motion and for good cause.
A motion for a stay of the remittitur or for approval of a supersedeas bond or for an order
suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an
appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision
appealed from. A motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court, but the
motion shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is not practicable, or
that the court rendering the decision has denied such a motion or has failed to afford the
relief which the movant requested, with the reasons given by the court rendering the
decision for its action. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be given to all parties. The
period of the stay, supersedeas or injunction shall be for such time as ordered by the court
up to and including the final disposition of the application for review. If the stay,
supersedeas, or injunction is granted until the final disposition of the application for
review, the party seeking the review shall, within the time permitted for seeking the
review, file with the clerk of the court which entered the decision sought to be reviewed, a
certified copy of the notice of appeal, petition for a writ of certiorari, or other application
for review, or shall file a certificate that such application for review has been filed. Upon
the filing of a copy of an order of the reviewing court dismissing the appeal or denying
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the petition for a writ of certiorari, the remittitur shall issue immediately. A bond or other
security on such terms as the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to
the grant or continuance of relief under this paragraph.
U. R. App. P. 36 (Mitchie 1995) (amended April 1, 2001)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case involves a dispute over lien priority on real property previously owned
by Lan England (the "subject property"). Appellant, Principal Funding Corporation
("PFC") claims to own a judgment previously obtained by Eugene Horbach on a
counterclaim against England, (the "Horbach Judgment"), in England v. Horbach, Civil
No. 930901471CV; 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). Appellee, MP Ventures, currently owns
the subject property acquired through a series of conveyances subsequent to the
foreclosure of a trust deed that secured a loan made to Mr. England. That trust deed was
recorded after the Horbach Judgment had been vacated by the Court of Appeals and
before it was reinstated by the Supreme Court. The district court in this action concluded
that the priority of the lien under the Horbach Judgment was the date it was reinstated
which was junior in priority to the foreclosed trust deed. Consequently, the foreclosure
of that senior trust deed extinguished the lien of the Horbach Judgment.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,

PFC caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to schedule an execution sale of the
subject property for November 20, 2001. MP Ventures brought this suit to enjoin the
Sheriffs sale. MP Ventures moved to enjoin the Sheriffs sale and sought a declaratory
21855vl
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judgment that PFC had no right to execute against the subject property. At the hearing on
MP Venture's motion for a preliminary injunction, the parties stipulated that the facts
were not in dispute and the court could make a final determination on the merits. After
receiving memoranda and evidence supporting and opposing MP Venture's motion and
hearing argument, the district court, the honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding, issued a
Memorandum Decision concluding that PFC's claimed lien on the subject property was
inferior to the trust deed through which MP Venture's title was derived, and was
extinguished by the trustee's sale under that trust deed. Accordingly, Judge Henriod
enjoined PFC from executing its judgment lien against the subject property. PFC moved
to amend the Memorandum Decision, which MP Ventures opposed. Judge Henriod
subsequently rejected PFC's motion to amend the ruling by entering Findings of F.act and
Conclusions of Law and a Final Judgment declaring that MP Ventures owns the subject
property unencumbered by PFC's claimed judgment lien. PFC appealed from this Final
Judgment.
C,

Statement of Facts.
1.

On April 18, 1994, Eugene Horbach obtained a judgment against

Lan England in the amount of $169,501.75 plus interest and costs on his counterclaims in
the action England v. Horbach, Civil No. 930901471CV (the "Horbach Judgment").
[Horbach Judgment R. 46-47, MP Ventures Addendum (MPV Add.) Exhibit 1].
2.

England appealed the trial court's judgment, and on October 19,

1995, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion reversing the trial court and vacating
21855vl
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the trial court's judgment. The Court of Appeals' opinion specifically states: "we vacate
the trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim, as defendant's right to
reimbursement for overpayment was settled under the accord and satisfaction." England
v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 301, 302 n.l. (1995) (emphasis added). [MPV Add. Ex. 2].
3.

In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provided:

(a) Date of Issuance.

(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or
shortened by order of the court
(b). . . A stay or supersedeas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application
for review may be granted on motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of
the remittitur or for approval of a supersedeas bond . . . must ordinarily be made in
the first instance in the court rendering the decision appealed from. A motion for
such relief may be made in the reviewing court,.... A bond or other security on
such terms as the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to the
grant or continuance of relief under this paragraph.
U. R. App. P. 36 (1995). [MPV Add. Ex. 3].
4.

The period for filing a writ for a petition for certiorari was 30 days

after the entry of the Court of Appeals' decision, and this period ended on Monday,
November 20, 1995. Utah R. App. P. 48 (1995).
5.

On November 20, 1995, Horbach filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Docket, MPV Add. Ex. 4].
6.

On November 22, 1995, thirty-three days after the Court of Appeals

entered its final decision, the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur to the district court
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and the remittitur was docketed by the district court on December 1, 1995. [Remittitur, R.
147-148, MPV Add. Ex. 5; Court of Appeals' Docket, R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex. 6;
District Court Docket, R. 145].
7.

Horbach did not move the Court of Appeals to stay the issuance of

the remittitur, nor for an enlargement of the time for issuance of the remittitur. Likewise,
Horbach did not ask the Court of Appeals to recall the remittitur, nor did he ask the
Supreme Court to stay or recall the remittitur. [Appellate Dockets, R. 260-261, MPV
Add. Ex.'s4, 6]
8.

On May 31, 1996, a deed of trust was recorded against the subject

property with the trustor being Lan C. England and the beneficiary Option One Mortgage
Corporation to secure a $500,000 loan from Option One Mortgage to Lan England, (the
"Option One Trust Deed"). [Option One Trust Deed, R. 95-100, MPV Add. Ex. 7].
9.

On May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion on the

certiorari petition. That opinion reversed the Court of Appeals decision and reinstated the
trial court's judgment. England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340. [MPV Add. Ex. 8].
10.

The subject property was sold at a trustee's sale under the Option

One Trust Deed on January 10, 2001. A trustee's deed was recorded at the Office of the
Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder as, Entry No. 7797085, in Book 8414, at Page 8416
naming Plaintiff Chase Manhattan Bank as Grantee. [Trustee's Deed, R 64-65].
11.

Chase Manhattan Bank conveyed the subject property to Tim

Linford, who in turn conveyed the subject property to MP Ventures. [Chain of Title, R
21855vl
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179-188].
12.

PFC caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to schedule an execution

sale of the subject property for November 20, 2001. [Amended Complaint, R. 79-108].
13.

The present action was brought before Judge Henriod by Chase

Manhattan/MP Ventures to enjoin the Sheriffs sale and declare PFC's lien on the subject
property extinguished by the foreclosure of the Option One Trust Deed. [Id.]
14.

Judge Henriod ruled that PFC's claimed judgment lien on the subject

property was inferior to the Option One Trust Deed, and was extinguished by the trustee's
sale. The district court concluded that a judgment lien does not exist independent of the
judgment on which the lien is based. Consequently, when the Horbach Judgment was
vacated, the judgment lien ceased to exist and did not encumber the subject property at
the time the Option One Trust Deed was recorded. Judge Henriod further concluded that
the priority of the lien arising under the reinstated judgment is the date the judgement was
reinstated. [Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 268-274, MPV Add. Ex. 10;
Final Judgment, R. 275-278, MPV Add. Ex. 11].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
PFC, the claimed owner of the Horbach Judgment does not hold a judgment lien
against the subject property. A judgement lien does not exist independent of a valid,
enforceable judgment. At the time the Option One Trust Deed was recorded, the Horbach
Judgment had been vacated; it was not valid nor enforceable; and it did not create a lien
on the subject property. Thus, PFC's judgment lien, which came into existence when the
21855vl
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Supreme Court reinstated the Horbach Judgment is inferior to the Option One Trust Deed,
and was extinguished, as to the subject property, by the foreclosure of the Option One
Trust Deed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION WAS NOT BASED ON THE
TIMELINESS OF HORBACH'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
In PFC's first point, PFC claims that Judge Henriod based his decision on an error

regarding the date and timeliness of Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari. [Appellant
Brief at 17-19]. However, while the Memorandum Decision recites the date that the
certiorari petition was docketed by the Court of Appeals rather than the date it was filed
in the Supreme Court, that date is immaterial to the district court's decision.
A.

PFC Misconstrues The District Court's Decision

MP Ventures agrees with PFC that Judge Henriod's Memorandum Decision
incorrectly states that Horbach filed a petition for certiorari on November 24, 1995.
[Mem. Dec. R. 213-215, MPV Add. Ex. 9]. November 24, 1995 is the day that the
certiorari petition was docketed by the Utah Court of Appeals rather than the date the
petition was filed with the Supreme Court. [Ct. App. Dckt. R. 261, MPV Add. Ex.6].
However, this date is not material to the district court's decision. Instead, the district
court was concerned with the requirements of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The paragraph of the district court's Memorandum Decision at issue states:
In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part,
21855vl
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that in the Court of Appeals,
[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of
the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
The time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days
from the entry of the Court of Appeals' decision. In this case, on October 19,
1995, the Court of Appeals issued a decision reversing and remanding the District
Court's Order. Then, on November 22, 1995, more than thirty days later, the
Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court.
[Mem. Dec. R. 213, MPV Add. Ex. 9 at 1 (emphasis added)]. The reference in this
paragraph to "more than thirty days later" concerns the proper time for the issuance of the
remittitur. Consequently, the basis for Judge Henriod's decision was the proper timing
and issuance of the remittitur by the Court of Appeals, not the date or timeliness of
Horbach's petition for writ of certiorari.
Furthermore, nowhere does Judge Henriod conclude that Horbach's petition was
untimely, and, moreover, the date of the certiorari petition was correctly stated in the
district court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law upon which the Final Judgment
was based. [Findings, R. 270, MPV Add. Ex. 10 at no. 4 ].* Accordingly, PFC's
argument that the district court erred in stating an improper date is based on PFC's
misinterpretation of the district court's decision and is flatly wrong.
B.

Neither MP Ventures Nor PFC Raised Or Presented The Timeliness Of
Horbach's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari As A Basis For The District
Court's Decision

1

"On November 20, 1995, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the Utah
Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the Court of Appeals." See Appellant
Statement of Facts No. 8.
21855vl
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A review of the briefs before the district court shows that neither party argued nor
discussed whether Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari was timely. Moreover, MP
Ventures never raised this issue nor presented it to the district court as a basis for its
decision. Accordingly, it is implausible that the district court sua sponte would seize on
an erroneous date as the basis for its decision without greater elaboration in its decision.
Instead, it is clear from Judge Henriod's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law that the decision was based on the fact that adequate time had
elapsed between the entry of the Court of Appeals' decision and the issuance of the
remittitur. Hence, the district court's alleged error regarding the timeliness of Horbach's
petition for a writ of certiorari is nothing more than a red-herring.
C.

MP Ventures Does Not Dispute That Horbach's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari Was Timely Filed

MP Ventures concedes that Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari was timely
filed in 1995. This timeliness, however, does not change the material facts established in
this suit; namely, that the Court of Appeals vacated the Horbach Judgment, and issued its
remittitur to the trial court after the period for filing a writ of petition for certiorari had
expired.
In sum, Judge Henriod's decision was not based on a determination of the
timeliness of Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari, and the reference to that date in
the Memorandum Decision is immaterial.

21855v1
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE
CORRECT BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUED ITS
REMITTITUR PROPERLY ACCORDING TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
OF THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, AND HORBACH
CHOSE NOT TO REQUEST A STAY OF THE REMITTITUR
In Point II of PFCs brief, PFC groups together four challenges to the district

court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. PFC claims that the district court
erred because
1.

It disregarded the obvious purpose of Rule 36. [Appellant Brief at 19-20.]

2.

Applying Rule 36 according to its plain terms limits the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. [Id at 20-21.]

3.

Horbach had no incentive to seek a stay of the remittitur. [Id at 21.]

4.

Even if Horbach had stayed the remittitur, it would not have been effective.
Ud.]

PFC's challenges are unfounded, and MP Ventures will address each one in order.
A.

The Court of Appeals Properly Issued Its Remittitur According to the
Plain Language of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Then in Effect

PFC claims that the district court erred by ignoring that "the purpose of the rule
[36] was obviously to provide that if a petition for wit (sic) of certiorari is indeed granted,
the record would be remitted to the Supreme Court." [Appellant Brief at 19 (emphasis
added)]. Thus, PFC concludes the district court failed to recognize that "the record on
appeal was inadvertently transferred by the clerk of the Court of Appeals to the District
Court. . . . " [ M a t 20].
21855vl
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PFC's argument is wrong because the obvious purpose of Rule 36 that PFC claims
the district court ignored directly contradicts the plain, unambiguous language of the rule
then in effect. In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provided:
(2)
In the court of appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
(3)
The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or
shortened by order of the court.
Utah R. App. P. 36 (1995) (emphasis added). [MPV Add. Ex. 3].
In cases determining the operation of procedural rules "this court has consistently
looked to the plain language of the applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining
to read additional language into the rule." Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, \ 11, 29 P.3d
1225 (interpreting filing requirements under rules 3 and 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure).2 There is nothing ambiguous about Rule 36 as it was written in 1995.
According to PFC the obvious purpose of Rule 36 was automatically to stay the remittitur
upon the filing of a petition for certiorari until the Supreme Court disposed of the
application for review. [Appellant Brief at 19]. However, Rule 36 plainly sets forth that
the remittitur may be stayed by order of the court, not by filing a petition for certiorari.
Moreover, Rule 36 provided that a stay of the remittitur could be had "on motion and for
good cause . . . ordinarily . . . in the court rendering the decision appealed from." U. R.
2

See also, Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah
1984) (applying procedural rule according to "plain, unambiguous language");
Hausknecht v. Industrial Comm 7i, 882 P.2d 683, 685 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (applying
plain language of mandatory rule of appellate procedure).
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App. P. 36(1995).
Furthermore, Rule 36 commanded that the Court of Appeals shall issue the
remittitur after the time for filing a petition for certiorari has expired. The use of the word
"shall" is presumed to mean mandatory. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, % 7, 989 P.2d
1073 (citing Board ofEduc. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030,
1035 (Utah 1983)). Thus, Rule 36 required the Court of Appeals to issue the remittitur
after the period for filing a petition for certiorari expired, with no provision to stay the
remittitur except by court order. Consequently, the plain language of Rule 36 directly
contradicts the obvious purpose that PFC claims the district court ignored.
Similarly, PFC's contention that the "record on appeal was inadvertently
transferred by the clerk . . . to the District Court" must be rejected. Instead, the Court of
Appeals issued its remittitur properly and effectively to the trial court in compliance with
the requirements of Rule 36. There is no dispute that the period for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari was thirty days after the Court of Appeals entered its decision. U. R.
App. P. 48. There is no dispute that the Court of Appeals properly issued its remittitur
thirty-three days after it issued its decision, [Remittitur, R. 147-148, MPV Add. Ex. 5; Ct.
App. Dckt, R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex. 6], and there is no dispute that Horbach did not
ask the Court of Appeals, nor the Supreme Court to stay the remittitur, or to recall the
remittitur. U. R. App. P. 36(a)(2) - (b); [Appellate Dckts., R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4,
6]. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly transmitted the record to the trial court in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 36.
21855vl

13

Finally, PFC cites Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Foothills Water Co.,
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), for the proposition that Rule 36 was amended to conform with
case law apparently recognizing an automatic stay of the remittitur upon filing a petition
for writ of certiorari. [Appellant Brief at 20]. However, neither Hi-Country Estates nor
White v. State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990), support the proposition that Rule 36 was
amended to conform to case law that required Rule 36 to be applied in any manner other
than according to its plain terms. Additionally, at the time of the Horbach suit, nowhere
did the rules, case law or statutes state that if a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed,
the Court of Appeals' remittitur was automatically stayed.
Furthermore, Hi-Country Estates does not control this case because it is
distinguishable. First, and most importantly, in Hi-Country Estates this Court held that
the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur prematurely and ineffectively because it was
issued before the time for filing a petition for certiorari had expired. 942 P.2d at 306,
307. In contrast, in this case, the Court of Appeals properly issued its remittitur, after the
time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari had expired. [Remittitur, R. 147-148, MPV
Add. Ex. 5; Ct. App. Dckt. R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex. 6]. Second, in Hi-Country
Estates, this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied Foothills' request
to recall its remittitur. Id. at 307; Acosta v. Labor Comm 'n, 2002 UT App. 67, ^13.
There is no corresponding error in this case because Horbach did not seek a stay of the
remittitur nor a recall of the remittitur from the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court.
[Appellate Dckts., R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4, 6]. Finally, in Hi-Country Estates, the
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trial court granted affirmative relief to the parties upon the authority o f the prematurely
issued remittitur. 942 P.2d at ^ A

T

" this case, the nnl\ issue r, v\ hcllici a j u d g m e n t lien

is pi esei v ed af tei tl ic C : i at t • : f \ p p e a l s vacates tl ic ji idgi i ici it ait i :1 pi opci ly i ei i lits the case
to the trial court. Fhe trial coui t did not gi aiit any affirmative relief to the parties after the
issuance of the reinittitui

Tlms, Hi-Country

Estates does not support P F C ' s proposition

that i .ik *6 w a s amended to confoi :t i i to existii ig case law, i 101: does it coi lti ol tl ic
c i ltcoi i le of tl lis case.
In sum, Rule 36, as it w a s written iii 1995, w a s plain and u n a m b i g u o u s . It required
the Court of \ p p e a l s to issue its remittitur offer i | l c p e n , . ; ;.

; .mj_T a petition for a writ of

according to the rule's requirements.
B

The 1995 Version of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Does Not Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court

PPf 1 \ ne> f claim a dial ii|»pl\ ni u K'ule Ut as il w.is n r i l l n u n I *>*'*>, w
s o m e h o w "limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme C o u r t .

iu

. as established b y l a w . "

[Appellant Brief at 20]. H o w e v e r , P F C makes n o i inn u > ^ p i , i m n<^. ^e proper
issiiai ice of tl ic i c i i littiti n t :»tl le tit la! cc i ii it l::a tl ic ( xyi n t : f \ ppeals ii i. ai iia wa) i edi iced tl le
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the England v. Horbach suit. It is simply unclear how
the Court of Appeals, which followed the plain language of Rule 36 somehow
circi n i isc! ibed tl: ic Si lpi ei i ic Coi II t's ability ' to i c vac ^ ' ill lat case
argument should be disregarded.

2I855vl
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Vccoi dii igl/y , PFC's

C.

Horbach Allowed the Court of Appeals to Vacate His Judgment by Not
Requesting a Stay of the Remittitur.

PFC claims that Horbach, as the judgment creditor, had no incentive to request a
"stay of the opinion of the Court of Appeals because the opinion did not become
operative until the case was remanded to the District Court and a judgment vacated."
[Appellant Brief at 21]. However, PFC fails to acknowledge the requirements of Rule 36
that applied to this case. In 1995, Rule 36 required the Court of Appeals to issue its
remittitur to the District Court after the period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari
expired. U. R. App. P. 36(a)(2) (1995). In order to stay the effect of the Court of Appeals'
decision, Rule 36 placed the burden squarely.upon Horbach to make a motion to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to stay the remittitur. Id. 36(a)(3) - (b); State v.
Palmer, 802 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 305.
However, Horbach chose not to pursue these procedural options, and allowed his
judgment to remain vacated while his case was reviewed by the Supreme Court.
[Appellate Dckts., R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4, 6].
The consequences of Horbach's choice are similar to those faced by the defendants
in Bulmash v. Davis, 597 P.2d 469 (Cal 1979), a case very closely on point. Addressing
the same issue that is before this court, the Bulmash court noted that a judgment creditor
has the ability to preserve its lien when a judgment is vacated and the vacating order
appealed:
Here, defendant had the ability to protect his rights after the vacating order by
requesting a stay of that order. Had he requested and obtained a stay, he would
21855vl
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have been allowed to retain h^ :icn by filing an undertaking insuring that he would
pay all costs and damages which the plaintiffs would sustain by reason of the lien
in the event that the order of the court below were sustained in favor of the
plaintiffs. Because no stay order was even requested, however, the vacated
judgment was invalid during the appeal and there was no defect in the proper*
the time it was transferred.
597 P.2d at 472-73. Similarly, 1lorbach had the power to prevent his judgment from
being vacated by seeking a stay of the remittitur.
The MliiiDi,1. < 'mill n! \pp».\ils addicssed a simihii

MIIMII

Harold Grabow, 392 N.E.2d 980, 983-85 (111. \pp Ct. , v / V
legatee complained of actions taken In die circuit oniri \\Ur !l

n in ( ,»/ AV Estate nf
.a Grabow, a residuary
-..Mini of appeals issued

its mandate, bul w hile (he legatee's petition for certiorari was pending in the state
siip

.

*

| In el inn | i if ;(p|H\ih slated

Another contention of the appellant-beneficiary is that tlic probate court had
no jurisdiction to approve the final accounting because there were two appeals
pending on matters pertinent to the estate. . . . The mandates issued on June 8,
1978, the appellant not yet having filed an affidavit of intent to seek review in the
Illinois Supreme Court. Both were recalled June 21, 1978, after petitions for leave
to appeal to the supreme court were filed on June 16, 1979 (sic). Both petitions
were denied on September 28, 1978, and the mandates were reissued from this
court on October 26, 1978. . . .
It seems clear that the first issuance of the mandate properly revested
jurisdiction in the probate court. ( Busser v. Noble (1961), 32 111. App. 2d 181.
N.E.2d 2 5 1 . ) . . . . Of course, the losing party has 56 days following the entry of
the judgment to file a petition for leave to appeal in the supreme court. . . . In the
event a petition is filed, the mandate may upon just terms be recalled until the
petition is ruled on oi a final disposition is had. . . . ( • il •- -\^ . • -:-ui is filed
before the mandate issues does the filing of the petition h\ itself affect the
jurisdiction of the lower courts.
From a fair reading of these rules, it is apparent that once the mandate is
filed in the circuit court, that court is revested with jurisdiction until a higher court,
or judge thereof, issues a stay or recalls the mandate regardless of the fact that a
petition for leave to appeal has subsequently been, filed in the supreme court. Had
21855vl
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the supreme court intended otherwise, it would have so provided.
. . . Ms. Galvin cannot now be heard to complain because she failed to take
the necessary action to obtain a stay or recall of the mandate.
392 N.E.2d at 983-84 (interior citations omitted). Thus, according to the Illinois rules, a
petition for certiorari filed after 21 days from the court's decision does not automatically
stay the mandate, id., and if the appellant does not take the necessary procedural
precautions, it cannot complain of further action taken by the lower court:.3 The same is
true in the federal court system. See Blum v. Caldwell, 446 U.S.1311; 100 S.Ct. 1635; 64
L.Ed.2d 225 (1980); Owens v. Hewell, 474 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996);'
Wheeler v. Goulart, 623 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C. 1993).5
Horbach could have kept a judgment lien in place by seeking a stay or recall of the
remittitur. Additionally, if Horbach's request to the Court of Appeals had been refused,
3

Other jurisdictions requiring an appellant to seek a stay of the remittitur when
applying for review in the state supreme court include Colorado C.A.R. 41; Illinois
Supreme Ct.R36& and North Carolina N.C. App.Proc.R.32.
4

We find no support for the contention that the filing of a petition for a writ
of certiorari prevents the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
from becoming final until the United States Supreme Court acts upon the
petition, where no stay of mandate has been filed under 28 U.S.C.A. §§
2101 (f). .. . While it is true that the actual granting of a writ of certiorari
does operate as a stay the mere petition for certiorari does not have such an
effect.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
5

The principal concern here is the assertion by appellant that she was denied
the possibility of further review of our judgment in the United States
Supreme Court because of the settlement during the time within which at
least theoretically appellant could have sought certiorari. However,
appellant took no advantage of our procedures to stay the issuance of the
mandate provided in D.C. App. R. 4Kb): . . .

Id. (emphasis added).
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he could have sought a stay in this Court. U. R. App. P. 36(b). However, Horbach elected
. ,i. -

• • : • - . UL-Kib.,R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4.

Had

•rbach felt it necessary, or w o n / *•;!•*. to preserve the priority of in-, .u.lgmc;.; \n n ie
could have accomplished i • = i " M a * ^

manner that would have avoided iH

the relief that Horbach failed to seek nearly seven years ago, nui. as 1 loiluelfs successor,
PFC can only obtain the same rights that Horbach elected to preserve for himself
^

A Stay of the Court of Appeals' Remittitur Would Have Prevented
I lorbach's Judgment From, Being Vacated

11 i , >iMiii

11.11 < ill If nil li i drlri mint III" zi'il'ii e of PH '^ u riutit nl in I he I mil Ih

point of this section. PFC seems to eiann that a sta\ ol L-\Lxai. n >\t>ui»i have no cticu on
•• Men because the creation of a judgment lien arises automatically b\ operation nl law.

of this argument, if Horbach had obtained a stay of the issuance of the remittitiir until Ilis
petition for a writ of certiorai i had been acted unon h \ 'U* Si.p*erne Court, it would have
prevented his judgment from being vacated

\ppcais.

i

OMI :

of the remittitur and the posting of security would have prevented the problem of which
PI C l i low col i lplaii is.
In sum, the district court's decision should be affirmed because the Coin t of
App. oi~; issiuui . •
IM!K

:..-.,..i :

i\ p-.-in i ia^na^. and reaiiiivments • -f R"fo 36

i tali Kuk-, .»: Appellate l^'oeeiluu Uiat were in elleel al ;iv ;a;;. . .A\-,\ :. ; ..

could have sought a stay of the remittitur at thai tunc and avoided these issues.
III.

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI DID NOT REVERSE T H E COURT O F
APPEAI,S DECISION AND REINSTATE THE HORBACH JUDGMENT
In Point III of P F C s brief, PFC claims that ueeanse the -\!•«* of -'-norar was

granted before the Option One 1 rust Deed was reconk . :*.
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: :;• •

. •;•

in

concluding that the priority of the Horbach Judgment lien was inferior to the trust deed.
[Appellant Brief at 21-22].
First, the petition for a writ of certiorari, though granted, did not reverse the Court
of Appeals' decision and reinstate the judgment. The grant of the petition merely
permitted further appellate review.
Second, PFC complains, apparently as a matter of public policy, that the
beneficiary of the trust deed "took the property subject to the [potential] lien against the
subject property." Id. Where the action affects the title to or possession of property,
section 78-40-2 of the Utah Code permits a party to record a lis pendens at the county
recorder's office to provide notice of the pending action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. The
Horbach action, however, was an action for a money judgment, and did not involve the
subject property at all. Consequently, no lis pendens was recorded, and there was nothing
in the real property records to afford notice of a potential judgment lien. Moreover, there
is no authority for the proposition that a vacated judgment or a writ of certiorari provide
constructive notice of an interest in real property. Under the judgment lien statute, a lien
does not exist independently of the judgment and, therefore, ceases to exist when a
judgment is vacated.6 If PFC's argument were accepted and the mere pendency of an
appeal would provide constructive notice of a potential judgment against all of the real
property of the potential judgment debtor, all property of anyone sued in a lawsuit would
be rendered unmarketable. Such a result would give a potential judgment creditor a pre6

Utah Code Ann.^ 78-22-1 (lien attaches to property during existence of
judgment); Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988) ("our statutory scheme
has no provision for an extension of a judgment lien independent of the judgment on
which it is based."); Bulmash, 597 P.2d at 470 ("A lien is accessory to the obligation on
which it is based; therefore, it would ordinarily be automatically invalid once the
judgment was vacated."); Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank of Maryland, 672 A.2d 625, 629
(Md. Ct. App. 1996) ("vacated means that the judgment is cancelled and consequently a
dependent judgment lien is destroyed.") (quoting In re Broyles, 161 B.R. 149, 155
(Bankr. D.Md. 1993) affd Broyles v. Schlossberg, 81 F.3d 27 (4th Cir. 1996).
21855vl

20

judgment wiit of attachment against all ofthe potential judgment debtor's real property
' ! ntt 101 it tl ic pi otection of a be nd ai id without due process.
Finally, PFC incorrectly characterizes the district court's ruling. Judge Henriod
d"f i'"i inlr th:ii NDIIVII'I* W;I in ;i Ivili r position t* *M-ot.vt ^ : judgment because the loan
was made befoii nu ^m - \ . riii-.uii was granted. [Appellant Bnei .

M.\I<;,

Judge Henriod adopted the rationale that Horbach could have protected his judgment and
!

;

M>

: • ••

I ' •• * :

*t - ^ v supra

\ ( tuh *< ipr i\ 36(a)(2) - (U)\ State v. Palmer, So; i d -4Sii iah \;-.,

'oom

Because a stay was available upon posting a supersedeas bond. as- a matter of r iblic
policy, 1 101 bacl i, PFC's pi edecessor, was v '

.••!]•«-

tl I " C : I n t

of Appeals' remittitur and protect the priori t> oi the hen arising from his judgment.
I '

PFC'S LIEN BASED ON THE HORBACH J UDGMEN I IS INFERIOR I O
THE BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST CREATED BY THE OPTION ONE
TRUST DEED
11| I ' m i l

"• i

•.••;»

;

-•

;

;i

• "

'

•'••:'

l a d e

this Court that its hen was superior u> the interest created b\ ine Option * >ne I s ast Deed.
PFC claii ns tl mt:
1

The district eoml erred by applying the rationale of a renewal judgment
when the judgment in this case was reinstated. [Appellant Brief, Sub-Point
A at 22-2J.J

2.

The judgment was not vacated by the Court of Appeals ! ul. Sub-Point B at
24 ]

3.

Even if the (VUM * ! Appeals \aeated die judgment, whet - A as reinstated,
it regained | »; f u . :

! • unt-i: -,.

26.]
4.
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.

2

1

Sub- Point D at 26-27.]
PFC's assertions are not valid, and they should be rejected. MP Ventures addresses these
arguments in turn.
A.

The District Court was Correct in Concluding That the Priority of the
Lien Arising From a Reinstated Judgement Does Not Relate Back to
the Date of the Vacated Judgment

PFC argues that the district court erred because it adopted the rationale in Cox
Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988), to conclude that the priority of the lien, arising
from the Horbach Judgment, is based on the date it was reinstated. PFC's argument is
that Cox addressed the renewal of a judgment, not the reinstatement of a judgment.
[Appellant Brief at 23]. Apart from distinguishing Cox on that ground, PFC offers no
authority or explanation as to how a lien survives between the time when a judgment is
vacated and the time when it is reinstated.
It is true that in Cox the Supreme Court considered whether the Hem of a renewal
judgment would relate back to the date of the original judgment. However, the rationale
of the Cox decision is applicable to this case. In Cox this Court concluded that when a
judgment expires, or ceases to exist, so does the lien.
The lien of a renewal judgment attaches only from the date of entry of the new
judgment and does not relate back to the date of the original judgment or extend
the prior lien. A renewal of a judgment results in a new judgment, which when
docketed creates a new lien.
754 P.2d at 939 (citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, there can be no dispute
that a judgment lien is strictly limited by the terms of the statute that created it: "[a]
judgment lien is purely a creation of statute. It does not exist in common law; therefore,
the rights of the parties must be determined within the statutory framework." Id. Indeed,
at all pertinent times, section 78-22-1 provided: "the entry of judgment by a district court
is a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, owned
21855vl
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or acquired dunng the existence of the judgment" Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1 (emphasis
;i H ( 1 p ( t ")i I T i ( »t h e t i i / ( > t • • I s: } a 1 i e i i o i 11 y a 11 a c 1 i e s d l 11 i it i g 11 i e e x i s t e n. c e o f 11 i e 111 c 1 g m e n t... 1 1 i c " i e
! -, n*) h e n w HiKhii • j u d g m e n t . See supra note 6; In re Infiltrator

Sys., hu ,2^'

H

!

777 (Bankr. D. Conn 2000) (Florida j u d g m e n t not entered in Connecticut according to
statutoi y i eqi lii et i. ie;t its does i lot ci eate liei i)

Ii istice Zii r in iei t i lai i, : oi I z\ ii i i.i ig v 'Till i. tl l :

Cox majority, conceded that "it is impossible to interpret our statute as permitting suivival
oi tl le lien without the sui vival of the under! ym<> liability.'' id. at 9 4 0 .
In this case, after the Court of Appeals vacated the Horbach J u d g m e n t the
judi \r.- \ aid not exist. Correspondingly, any lien based oii the IIorbach Judgment also
ceased to exist.
Applyii ig tl IC i ationale in Cox to tb * -KM-- n»'4us case is consistent with other
courts addressing similar circumstances
entered by the tria; - -;n :
app---

*<^t»L.'i

\ n v \ \ a s u m m a r v ;IM. •

\

I • • • .4 court subsequently vacated the j u d g m e n t and an

"

•

•

•: i

]•• Mding, ine judgine ;i debtors

sold hoii.c of their real property V -i»rd parties, hi. a;

S o m e (,mc later, the

California Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment aiid ordered the \ acatui
judgm< nl In In1 ii".tmnl

' i In ilr\i ulnm\ llie

ISSIK

-s s

lln Hu •

•H" IIY.IH:

before us is w heiher a IK n pursuant to j u d g m e n t relates back u» ihe oi miuai vi* •"
recording after reversal of the order vacating the judgment." >!
t h i l l t i n l i t i i in" I n II ni (" 11 0 , 1 n I ni i

ulilli •

iln

lL|)[iiMllllg

u 4 Vi

(Mil \ o h l H U »a

b.,.i

The o n n i held
|»iev(iii

enforcement of the vacating order. The court's analysis is instructive:
A lien therefore cannot exist apart from the judgment upon which it is
based. Thus, in the ordinary course of events when the judgment is vacated
by court order the lien will also cease to exist, because the effect of a
vacating order is to eliminate the judgment. . . . Once vacated, the status of
the parties that existed prior to the judgment is restored and the situation
then prevailing is the same as though the order or jildgment had never been
made.
BecaiJM' Ihe judj'.iin nl » < i;l« I hoi be enfourd »>fi< < it w ,i\ > ac.ilrd lln hm
21855vl
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also became ineffective. Accordingly, the land was not subject to a lien at
the time of its transfer.
Id. at 471-72 (emphasis added); accord 46 Am Jur. 2d Judgments § 409, at 708 (1994). In
reaching its conclusion, the California court noted that the judgment creditor "had the
ability to protect his rights after the vacating order by requesting a stay of that order," and
that if a stay had been obtained, "he would have been allowed to retain his lien by filing
an undertaking insuring that he would pay all costs and damages which the plaintiffs
would sustain by reason of the lien in the event that the order of the court below were
sustained in favor of plaintiffs." Id. at 472-73. The Utah Supreme Court adopted the
identical analysis in holding that the reversal of an order releasing a lis pendens does not
revive the lis pendens as of the date it was originally recorded unless there is a stay of the
order upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381,
1393 (Utah 1996).
Decisions from New York and Colorado also make it clear that the lien of a
reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of reinstatement. In Mansfield State
Bank v. Cohn, N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. Supp. 1981) affd sub nom, 451 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y.
A.D. 1982) and 446 N.E.2d 768 (N.Y. 1983), the New York court was faced with the
issue of determining the priority of a Texas judgment filed in New York, subsequently
vacated and then reinstated by Texas courts.7 The New York court held that the lien was
not in effect during the period that the judgment was vacated and the property could be
sold, concluding "the vacating of a judgment renders it no longer in existence and any
liens evolving therefrom are dissolved." 436 N.Y.S.2d at 557. Similarly, in First
National Bank ofTelluride v. Fleisher, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a

7

"The issue to be determined is whether the final appellate reversal of a judgment
or order of an intermediate appellate court, which had reversed and vacated an initial
judgment of a trial court, reinstates the original trial court judgment as of the date it was
originally entered." Id. at 557.
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judgment's priority would not relate back to the entry of an earlier deiai.- ^pigment that
had been vacated b) the trial court. 2 P.3d 706. 71 ^ ' ^ (<••..• •<><)()). Consequently, a
trust need gram

•

• ' • . • * . • ' ;

• K ^"

before final judgment was entered, had priority over the judgment lien u ai

?

Accordii igly, the district court was correct in applying the rationale of the Cox decision
and ruling that tl ic priority p f p r r \ lien i^ ociesnuned !. ;n

. . wl ic i i I ioi bach's

judgment was reinstated.
Ill

The Court of Appeals V aeated the Horbach Judgment

in PFC's second poii it Sub-Point B, PFC argues that the Court of Appeals did not
vacate the Horbach Judgment because wl lei i I loi bac 1 i filed 1 lis petitioi i tc i a wi it of
certiorari tin: ea--e -A I a = ; undei appellate review. [Appellant Brief at 24]. However,
d^r-

r :

" • '

•

*• .."...

*-ates,t\

•

'

i--u

did vacate the

Horbach Judgment because the language in the opinion ;s clcai, it was within the
jurisdiction and Mv pouer of the Court ot'Appeals to v^u ate the judgment; and the Court

First, the language of the Court of Appeals' opinion leaves no room to o lestion the
c o i F f \ oidei

" 'i"" ( niirt " I \ p p ' \ i !
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language is simple, clear and not subject to confusion: the Horbach Judgment was
vacated.
Second, the Conn ol \ ppeals had proper jurisdiction and the resulting authority to
"reverse, , r '

'

• vv ise dispose of ai \y oi :lei oi ji idgi i lei it appealer •

Utah R. \nr* /'. H)(a). \ acating the Horbach Judgment was well within the scope of he
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Court of Appeals'power. See e.g. Merhish
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lower court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss." (internal citation omitted))/
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Eckard v. Smith, 545 P.2d 501, 502 (Utah 1976) (appellate court vacating decree of
specific performance). Hence, not only was it within the Court of Appeals' power and
jurisdiction to vacate the trial court's judgment, the language of the court's opinion leaves
no question that it exercised this power.
Third, the Court of Appeals' vacatur of the Horbach Judgment was effective
because the court properly remitted the case to the trial court pursuant to Rule 36 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Again, PFC relies on High Country Estates in its
attempt to convince this Court that the Court of Appeals' action was not effective.
However, High Country Estates is markedly different from this case. In High Country
Estates, the Supreme Court granted Foothills an extension of time for filing a petition for
a writ of certiorari. 942 P.2d at 305. The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the trial
court before the period for Foothills to file its petition for a writ of certiorari had expired.
Id. Therefore, this Court held that:
[a]t the time the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur, this Court had extended
Foothills' time to file a petition for certiorari. Foothills' time to seek certiorari had
therefore not expired. The Court of Appeals issued its remittitur prematurely, and
jurisdiction was never returned to the trial court.
Id. at 306. As a result, the Court held that: [t]he judgment of the district court is void
because the court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment while the case was still pending
in the appellate court." Id. at 307.
In contrast, in this case, Judge Henriod correctly concluded that the Court of
Appeals issued its remittitur properly and effectively according to the requirements of
Rule 36 then in effect. The Court of Appeals' decision was entered on October 19, 1995.
[MPV Add. Ex. 2]. Thirty-three days later, on November 22, 1995, after the period for
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari had expired, the Court of Appeals remitted the case
back to the trial court. [Remittitur, R. 147-148, MPV Add. Ex. 5]. Horbach's time to file
a petition for certiorari from the Supreme Court had not been extended, and in fact,
21855vl
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Horbach timely filed his petition within .n i iiiu-day period allowed n> me rue of
appellate procedure. U. R. i ipp.PA%.
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while he sought further review from the Supreme Court.
Finally, in High Country Estates, the trial coiirt entered an order granting
affirmative relief between the parties after the remittitur issued prematurely. Iti contrast,
in Ihis case, tlieic is no «tt^irm«tti\ \ n In fdial ocvttf ird .dler (lit
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19 5 6), foi t; 1 i i s

"; it r < I . \l; t1 e t. 111 n I 111 V v (

t1111' I" / A 11i tt 11 d<11 r i > i i 1 1111'

date from which to calculate post judgment interest. In other words, tlle issue was
whether a judgment debtor is entitled to interest as of tin* dale of" the ordinal judgment or
as of tl ic date of i eii lstatei i ici it. 302 I ' 2d at 712
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the date that the indebtedness was correctly established, the date of the original judgment.
M a t 714.
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In this case, however, PFC's claim is a full degree removed from the issue in
Hewitt. In Hewitt, the Court determined the date of indebtedness in order to calculate the
correct amount of post judgment interest on that debt. In contrast, PFC seeks to establish
the date of priority of a lien that arises pursuant to an enforceable judgment. The date of
the lien's priority is completely distinct from the amount of indebtedness or proper
interest on that debt which was at issue in Hewitt. In fact, the lien's priority date has no
effect on the amount of Horbach's judgment nor the interest to accrue on that debt.
While a court may determine the date of indebtedness between parties in order to
grant complete relief between them, it is quite different to ask this Court to place a lien
for a debt ahead of third parties. Horbach was granted complete relief in his action, and
the date of the lien's priority does not alter the amount of that judgment nor the interest
accruing on that judgment. PFC asks this Court to alter the priority of the lien in relation
to a third party and on property neither of which were involved in the underlying suit. As
explained earlier, the judgment lien does not exist independently of the judgment. See
supra note 6. Therefore, PFC's lien came into existence at the time the Supreme Court
reinstated the previously vacated judgment, and not before.
D.

The Supreme Court's Decision to Accept a Petition for Certiorari Does
Not Create a Lis Pendens on Property Unrelated to the Litigation, and,
Horbach, PFC's Predecessor, Was in the Best Position to Preserve the
Priority of His Judgment Lien,

PFC claims that because the Supreme Court granted Horbach's petition for a writ
of certiorari before the Option One Trust Deed was recorded, the trust deed beneficiary
should be deemed to have notice of PFC's "potential lien" in the same manner of a lis
pendens. [Appellant Brief at 26-27]. However, PFC points to no authority to support its
assertion that a petition for a writ of certiorari granted by the Supreme Court places a lis
pendens on property that is not subject to the litigation. Moreover, as discussed above,
the action between England and Horbach was one for a money judgment, and it did not
21855vl
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affect the title to nor the right of possession of the subject property. See Utah Code Ann.
§78-40-2.8 "Utah law does not allow for the filing of lis pendens in cases seeking a
:

moneyjudgmei
v. Schulmann,
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1999 I J T A p p 119 ffi| 22-22, 977 P.2d 1218. 1 1 11 is, this C o u r t ' s acceptance

of I lot bach's petitioi 1. foi cei tioi ai i did 1 IC t pi it tl ne ti 1 1st deed beneficiary on notice of a
"potential lien."
CONCLUSION
In sun1, the priority of PFC's claimed judgment lien on the subject property was

Trust Deed was recorded. Because the liei1 of the 1einstatedjudgment was junioi m
priority, it was foreclosed h\ M, :rustee's sale under the Option One I n^f Deed. Wv ihe
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district c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t , and a ,\ ;u"(i u> M l ' \ cntures its costs on appeal puisim-i .« 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Respectfully submitted this ^J_ day of May, 2002.

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

By: ^JJ//)
Ro^jdHg^-Rtissell
Jeffipy D. Stevens
Attorneys for Appellee

8

Ii1 any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff . . or . . the defendant. . . may file for record with the recorder of the county in
which the property or some part tl lereof is situated a notice of the pendency of the action .
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ADDENDUM
Tl le I Io! bacl i Ii idgi t ici it Recoi d < 16 17.
Utah Court of ' \.pp€ als opii lioi i England v Hi ; wh i< :h 905 P 2d 301,, issi red Octobei
19,1995.
Hie 1995 version of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Docket of the Utah Supreme CoinI for England v. Horbach.
Remittitur issued by the Utah Couri of Appeals o-i N •*•« niher ??. 1 0 ( ^ Record
147-148
Docket ol the I 'tali i ouit ol appeals loi En^ltuul \ Ho *f bach.
I lie * fptlinni i lilt

| ni || ( I i
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I ' t v o n t M i Km!.

Utah Supiatie 1 i iiil i| Jin -ii, / ii{'j\iih! \ Horbdi h ( M - '
1997.

* - *s *-.•.* ' \< .

Memorandum Decisioii, Chase Manhattan Bank, and MP Ventures, L.C v.
Principle Funding Corp., case 010910255. Record 213-215,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Chase Manhattan Bank, and MP
Ventures, L.C. v. Principle Funding Corp., case 010910255. Record 268-274.
Final Judgment, Chase Manhattan Bank, and MP Ventures, L.C. v. Principle
Funding Corp., case 010910255. Record 275-278.
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Stephen G. Crockett (#0756)
Wesley D. Felix (#6339)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BEHDINCER &
PETERSON
170 South Main, 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Steven L. Taylor (13210)
Of Counsel with
MURPHY, TOLBOE 6 XABET
124 South 600 East, 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505
Attorneys for Defendant
in THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAXX COUHTf
STATE OF UTAH
LAW C, ENGLAND,
Plaintiff,
ve,

JUDGMENT

EUGENE HORBACH, an Individual,
KEDICOOK, INCORPORATED, ft
Utah corporation, and DOES I
throuqh Y,

Civil No. 930901471CT
Judge J, Dennis Frederick

Defendants*
The above-en titled matter cajee on regularly for trial
before the Honorable J. Dennlsj Frederick, sitting without a Jury,
on May 22, 1994.

The Court having considered the oral and

documentary evidence presented, the Issues having been duly tried
and a decision having been duly rendered* It is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

That the Kay 23rd putative agreement between

Plaintiff and Defendant was executed under a smtual mistake of

EXHIBIT "A"

fact and was without consideration And,

therefore, is

unenforceable.
2.

That all causes of action contained in Plaintiff's

Complaint are denied end dismissed with prejudice.
3.

That funds in escrow account no. 30804165 in the

amount of 5369,140,60, held pursuant to the escrow agreement
entered into by the Plaintiff, the Defendant and Guardian State
Ban*, Salt LaXe City, Utah and all accrued interest shall be
lsKiediately released and disbursed to the Defendant or to his
attorneys of record.
VV

4.

That Judgment is granted to Defendant against the

Plaintiff in the amount of $169,501.73.
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication m the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OC: ' 3 1995
rOUPT

p,

f '-*PPEALS

ooOoo
Lan C. England,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n )
Case No. 940695-CA

v
Eugene Horbach, and Medicode
Incorporated, and Does
I through V,

F I L E D
(October 19, 19951

Defendants and Appellees.

Third D i s t r i c t , S a l t Lake County
The Honorable J . Dennis F r e d e r i c k
Attorneys:

Samuel D. McVey and Randy T. Austin, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Stephen G. Crockett, Steven E. McCowin, Wesley D.
Felix, and Steven L. Taylor, Salt Lake City, for
Appellees

Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Plaintiff, Lan C. England, appeals from the trial court's
dismissal of his complaint and judgment in favor of defendant,
Eugene Horbach. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it
held the parties7 accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. We
agree and therefore reverse and remand.1

1. Because we conclude the trial court erred when it found the
accord and satisfaction was unenforceable, we need not reach
plaintiff's remaining claims on appeal. Moreover, we vacate the
trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim, as
defendant's right to reimbursement for overpayment was settled
under the accord and satisfaction.

FACTS
In late 1989 or early 1990, plaintiff and defendant entered
into a contract whereby defendant agreed to purchase 258,363
shares of Medicode stock from plaintiff. The parties agreed the
purchase price would be $2.75 per share, resulting in a total
purchase price of $710,498.25. At trial, plaintiff testified and
defendant did not dispute, that the purchase money was to be paid
within the first .quarter of 1990. Defendant made periodic
payments on the stock at least through September 1990.
In May 19 91, at defendant's request, the parties met to
finalize the stock purchase. At this time, plaintiff still
retained the stock certificates and believed defendant owed
additional money on the original purchase agreement. Plaintiff
also believed defendant had breached the original stock purchase
agreement by failing to pay the entire amount within the agreed
time. At the May meeting, plaintiff informed defendant that at
least $25,000 was still owing under the original purchase
agreement. Defendant did not dispute that amount. The parties
then reached an agreement whereby defendant agreed to remit to
plaintiff an additional $25,000 and hold in trust two percent of
the Medicode stock for plaintiff. In return, plaintiff agreed to
immediately transfer to defendant the stock certificates and to
forego his right to sue for defendant's breach of the original
agreement.
At trial, both parties agreed that plaintiff would not have
transferred the stock certificates- to defendant had the second
agreement not been entered into. Further, both plaintiff and
defendant testified that at the May meeting both believed that
money was still owing under the original contract.
In December 1992, pursuant to the second agreement,
plaintiff made a demand for the two percent Medicode stock that
defendant was purportedly holding in trust for him. Defendant,
however, refused to produce the stock, contending that the two
percent agreement was meant only to secure defendant's payment of
the additional $25,000. Plaintiff therefore sued defendant for
breach of the two percent agreement. Prior to trial, defendant
discovered additional business records which defendant claimed
documented that, before entering into the second agreement, he
had actually overpaid plaintiff for the purchase of the Medicode
stock.
A bench trial was held on March 22, 1994. The court railed
that plaintiff could not enforce the second agreement as an
accord and satisfaction because it was not supported by
consideration and because it was based upon a mutual mistake that
defendant owed additional money on the original agreement. The
trial court therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint and entered

Q
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judgment in favor of defendant based upon his "counterclaim"
alleging that, at the time the second agreement was entered,
defendant had already overpaid plaintiff for the Medicode stock.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
It is settled that
rl

[a] n accord and satisfaction arises when the
parties to a contract: mutually agree that a
performance different than that required by
the original contract will be made in
substitution of the performance originally
agreed upon and that the substituted
agreement calling for a different performance
will discharge the obligation created under
the original agreement."
Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp, v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193,
1197 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Tebbs, Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks,
735 P.2d 1305, 1307 (Utah 1986)) . Moreover, for an accord and
satisfaction to have any legal effect, the elements of a
contract, including consideration, must be present. Id. at 119798. The elements of an accord and satisfaction include:
(i) a bona fide dispute [or uncertainty] over
an unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment
tendered in full settlement of the entire
dispute; and (iii) an acceptance of the
payment.
Estate
States
Mart on
accord

Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain
Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992) (citing
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985});
Neiderhauser, 824 P.2d at 1197-98.
A.

Consideration2

In its first claim of error, plaintiff contends the trial
court erred when it concluded the second agreement did not
constitute an accord and satisfaction because there was no
2. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should be precluded from
raising this issue on appeal because it was not raised at trial.
A careful review of the record, however, reveals that whether the
second agreement was predicated on sufficient consideration was,
in fact, raised by plaintiff at trial. More significantly,
consideration formed one basis for the trial court's
determination that the accord and satisfaction was unenforceable.

Q/in^:Qc_P7\

consideration to support that agreement. In Utah, it is clear
that consideration for an accord may consist of a compromise of a
bona fide dispute or uncertainty as to the amount actually owing.
See, e.g., Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730, 733
(Utah 1985) (holding sufficient consideration exists when
creditor agrees to accept lesser amount than is due where bona
fide dispute as to amount is present) ; Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980) (stating where
underlying claim is uncertain, assent to definite payment amounts
to sufficient consideration) ; accord In re Estate of Grimm, 784
P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 752 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1990). Moreover, " [i] t is not necessary for the dispute
[or uncertainty] to be well-founded so long as it is in good
faith.'1 Golden Key, 699 P. 2d at 733/ see also Ashton v. Skeen,
85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935).
Thus, if the parties in good faith believe there is a
disputed or uncertain claim, mere settlement of the amount due
and acceptance of that amount constitutes the consideration
necessary to support the contract. Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at
326; accord Golden Key, 699 P.2d at 733/ Ashton, 39 P.2d at 1076,
In the instant case, plaintiff received several checks from
defendant in partial satisfaction of the original agreement over
a nine month period. Plaintiff believed defendant still owed
between $25,000 and $75,000 on the original purchase agreement.
When the parties met at defendant's request in May 1391,
plaintiff informed defendant of the amount he believed was then
due and offered to settle the original contract for an additional
$25,000 and two percent of the Medicode stock. Defendant did not
dispute this claim, as he was equally unsure of the amount then
owing on the original purchase agreement. Rather, he accepted
the proposal in the interest of resolving the matter.
At that meeting, defendant was interested in getting the
stock certificates and plaintiff was interested in getting paid
the full purchase price. Although unfounded, plaintiff asserted
in good faith that he believed additional money was still owing.
Defendant accepted this representation without dispute and
accepted plaintiff's resolution proposal. The May 1991 agreement
reflects the parties' good faith bargain regarding an uncertain
claim. We conclude the trial court erred when it determined the
second agreement was not supported by consideration and was
therefore unenforceable.3

3.
Moreover, we note that courts have found that forbearance to
prosecute a legally enforceable claim or to perform an act which
one is not otherwise legally bound to perform provides sufficient
consideration. Safety Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 648
(continued...)
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B.

Mutual Mistake

Plaintiff further claims the trial court erred when it held
that because neither party was aware that defendant had already
paid the original purchase agreement in full, a mutual mistake of
fact precluded the enforcement of the accord and satisfaction.
An accord and satisfaction based upon a mutual mistake as to
a material fact can be rescinded by either party. Deibel v.
Kreiss, 50 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); 6 Arthur L.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1292, at 178 (1962).
" XA mutual
mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting,
share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon
which they based their bargain. ' " Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d
254, 258 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d
666, 669 (Utah App. 1992)). Thus, an accord and satisfaction may
be rescinded where there is a mutual mistake as to the bargain
giving rise to the accord.
Accepting the facts as found by the trial court, at the May
1991 meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken that additional
money was owed under the original agreement. However, this
mistake did not go to the terms of the parties' accord; rather,
it merely demonstrates their accord was indeed a compromise of a
bona fide dispute which was not necessarily well-founded, but was
made in good faith. See In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238,
1244 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
In the instant case, both parties were uncertain as to the
amount that remained owing on the original contract when they
entered into their agreement. Although mistaken as to whether
money was then owing, the parties were clearly not mistaken as to
the agreement they reached to compromise a good faith, though
mistaken, claim. The accord and satisfaction accurately reflects
the intent of the parties at the time it was entered. There was

3. ( ...continued)
P.2d 267, 270 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); accord Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Long v. Forbes, 136
P.2d 242, 246-47 (Wyo. 1943). Thus, , M the giving of further time
for the payment of an existing debt by a valid agreement, for any
period however short, . . . is a valuable consideration, and is
sufficient to support'" a contract. Farmers & Merchants State
Bank v. Higgins, 89 P.2d 916, 917 (Kan. 1939) (citation omitted);
accord Sucrarhouse Fin. , 610 P.2d at 1372.
In the instant case, although the entire debt was to be paid
within the first quarter of 1990, plaintiff extended payment
through 19 91.

Qdfl^QCI-rA

therefore no mistake regarding a basic assumption underlying the
accord and satisfaction, thus, in is not void.4
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the
accord and satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration
and because we conclude the agreement was not founded upon a
mutual mistake of fact, we reverse and remand for further action
consistent with this opinion.

L&r. yn- SLteiftJ
W / V

Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Gregory K.^orme,

fcfing Judge

if/ ,s'V #) &S

*

Russell W. Bench, Judge

4. To illustrate the difference between a bona fide uncertainty
which is compromised by an accord and satisfaction from a mutual
mistake going to the essence of the accord, the following example
is helpful. If, in this case, the parties had agreed to exchange
$25,000 for 258,363 shares of stock which both parties believed
was transferable and it was then discovered the stock was not
transferable, a mutual mistake as to the essence of the accord
and satisfaction would be present. Under such a scenario, the
mistake--that the stock was transferable--goes directly to a
basic assumption underlying the substitute agreement and
therefore constitutes a mutual mistake which voids that
agreement. In the instant case, the parties were mistaken as to
facts relevant to the original contract--whether money was then
due and owing--not as to a term underlying the accord and
satisfaction.
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FeTi^rrt fr>r rehearing,

(a; TiiK-e fee Sifegj contents; nn£V'cr; oral argument not permitted. A
rehearing vrlli n x De granted :n the absence of a petition for rehearing. A
petition for rehearing may be filed vrith the clerk within 14 days after the
entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by
order. The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact
which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and
shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner desires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless requested by the court. The answer to the petition for rehearing shall be filed
within 14 da5^s after the entry of the order requesting the answer, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in
the absence of a request for an answer.
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by
Eule 27. An original and six copies shall be filed with the court. Two copies
shall be served on counsel for each party separately represented. Except by
order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response requested by the
court shall not exceed 15 pages.
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.
(d) Uiitin&efy or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing
will not be received by the clerk.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, m Subdivision
(b), deleted "and copies shall be served and

filed as prescribed by Rule 26" from the end of
the first sentence and added the second and
third sentences

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur 2d Appeal and
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 829
Error §§ 978 to 9S4.
to 835.
C. J.S. — 5 C J S. Appeal and Error § o^S et
seq

Rule 88. Issuance of remittitur.
(aj Date of issuance.
(1) In the Supreme Court the remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days
after the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed,
the remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order
disposing of the petition.
(2"1 In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court snail issue immediately after the expiration of the time for Sling a petition for writ of

IllGwlCn ILL Ll-wli i3_ic;- - ^ c ^ / ~ s ZL.c -~

— ull^ .L r v i c ~,-ng v O ^ o , J

shall shcv that a motion in ihs cc^rl, rendering the decision is not practicable,
or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a motion cr has failed
to afford the relief ~-hich the movant requested, with the reasons given by the
court rendering the decision for its action. Reasonable notice of the motion
shall be given to ail parties. The period of the stay, supersedeas or injunction
shall be for such time as ordered by the ccurt up to and including the final
disposition of the application for review. If che stay, supersedeas, or injunction
is granted until the final disposition of the application for review, the party
seeking the review shall, within the time permitted for seeking the review,
file with the clerk of the ccurt which entered the decision sought to be reviewed, a certified copy cf the notice of appeal, petition for writ of certiorari, or
other application for review, or shall file a certificate that such application for
review has been filed. Upon the filing of a copy cf an order of the reviewing
court dismissing the appeal or denying the petition for a writ of certiorari, the
remittitur shall issue immediately. A bond or other security on such terms as
the court deems appropriate may be required a3 a condition to the grant or
continuance of relief under this paragraph.
(Amended effective October 1. 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Counsel
should note that the petition for certiorari
alone is not sufficient to stay the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. Counsel must also file a
motion to stay the remittitur-or-fox-an mjunction or sunersedeas. Although the time ior tiling the petition for writ of certiorari is 30 days
from the entry cf the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the motion for the stay muBt be filed
within 14 days cf the entry of the decision of

the Court of Appeals or within five days of the
entry of a decision regarding a motion for rehearing.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend^ ^
Qctober
iS92
8ubdivided
.N
,,.
'
' _
n ,,;: . .
Subdivision (a), adding Jin the Supreme
Co
^ to t h e beginning of Subdivision (1) and
adding Subdivision (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Palmer, 802 F.2d 743 (Utah
App. 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 939 to 945.

C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 886 et
seq.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=* 1140.

Rule 37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal.
(a) Suggestion of mootness. It is the duty of each party at all times during the course of an appeal to inform the court of any circumstances which
have transpired subsequent to the filing of the appeal which render moot one
or more of the issues raised. If a party determines that one or more issues
have been rendered moot, the party shall forthwith advise the court by filing a
"suggestion of mootness" in the form of a motion under Rule 23. If the parties
to the appeal agree as to the mootness of an issue, a stipulation to that effect
should be filed, and unless otherwise directed by the court, the appeal will
then proceed as to the remaining issues; if all issues in the appeal are mooted
and the parties stipulate thereto, the suggestion of mootness shall be presented to the court pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this rule.
(b) Voluntary dismissal. If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding
shall sign and file with the clerk an agreement that the proceeding be dismissed, specifying the terms as to payment of costs and shall pay whatever
fees are due, the clerk shall enter an order of dismissal, unless otherwise
directed by the ccurt. An appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant
upon such terms as ma3~ be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court.
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^land v. Horbach
:ket No: 950506
Docket Date: 11/20/1995
). Type: Writ of Certiorari
Agency: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
Case: 930901471CV
Status: Closed
Staff:
1 C. England - Respondent
SAMUEL D. MCVEY ( KIRTON & MCCONKIE )
RANDY T. AUSTIN ( KIRTON & MCCONKIE )
iene Horbach - Petitioner
STEVEN G. CROCKETT ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY )
STEVEN L. TAYLOR ( MABEY & COOMBS, L.C. )
STEVEN £. MCCOWIN ( ATTORNEY AT LAW )
WESLEY D. FELIX ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY )
icode Incorporated - Petitioner
STEVEN G. CROCKETT ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY )
STEVEN L. TAYLOR ( MABEY & COOMBS, L.C. )
STEVEN E. MCCOWIN ( ATTORNEY AT LAW )
WESLEY D. FELIX ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY )
11/20/1995

Writ of Certiorari Filed

12/26/1995

Response to Writ

Granted

02/13/1996

12/27/1995
Miscellaneous
telephone call the petitioners will be sending a
lacement attachment, (replace b efore distribution) .
12/29/1995
Supplement
rect Findings of Fact and Concl usions of Law filed by
ven E. McCowin.
01/02/1996

Reply to Response to Petition

32/13/1996

Writ of Certiorari Granted

32/23/1996
Record Filed-With Transcript
}ls. pleadings; 4 vols, transcripts; 2 envs. exhibits.
Ltioner's brief is due April 8, 1996.
04/08/1996 RCH
;4/05/1996
Extension of Time for AppellanGranted
itea that Appellants brief is due on or before 4-23i-96.
)4/16/1996
Clerk's Note
fol. Record , 2 Env. Checked out by Wesley D. Felix of
luque, Croc kett, Bendinger & Peterson.
)4/23/1996
Brief Lodged
>rd needs t o be returned by Wes ley Felix before briefs
be dockete d.
14/24/1996
Appellant's Brief Filed
>fs arrived by mail and were po st marked 4-23-96.
15/20/1996
Extension of Time for AppelleeStipulatio
>ulated that appellee may have up to and including
> 21, 1996. (30 days)
6/21/1996

Appellee's Brief Filed

Vrj..-2 Env. checked out by Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger &
eterson.
07/17/1996
Calendared
: for 10/07/1996 at 13:30
07/22/1996
Extension of Time for Reply BrGranted
pellant is granted to 8-7-96 to file reply brief.
08/07/1996

07/22/1996 RCH

Appellant's Reply Brief Filed

08/07/1996
Clerk's Note
LLDA returned record this date: 6 vols., 2 envs,
08/19/1996

Appllee Supp Authority to Brie

10/07/1996

Submitted on Oral Argument

05/30/1997
Opinion Filed
rham, J. - Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed
i the trial court judgment reinstated.
06/13/1997
Petition for Rehearing
Denied
Led by Samuel McVey on behalf of the appellants.
08/25/1997

08/25/1997

Petition for Rehearing Denied

10/01/1997
Remitted
iitted to Third District Court Salt Lake County,
volumes, 2 envelopes.
12/31/9999
Clerk's Note
ix #'s: Randy Austin - 321-4893.

spared By

Phone

Date

:

-. V:x undersigned, Clerk cf tto Ul:;i Suprcrr..
Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a
true and correct copy of an original documenl
en file iiUJnrttoh Supreme Court. In testimony
v:hcreo/l bav^eLmy hanj^nd affixed the sea!
cfthetettKV
QY
Pat H-Bartholomew
Cl£fk \\ the Court < r - ^
Deputy Clerk

Date ^
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NOV 2 2 1995
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS
,
Lan C. England,

-:

ooOoo-'---

LS!i^..lZZj

-!

Plaintiff and Appellant,

REMITTITUR
Case No. 940695-CA

v.
FILED OISTRO COURT

Eugene Horbach, and Medicode
Incorporated, and Does
I through V,

Third Judicial District

nrn o t IQQS

Defendants and Appellees

By.

S_Q Vyo-

iputyCJeri

This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, the
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, and the OPINION
having been issued, the matter is hereby remitted.
This 22nd day of November, 1995.

Opinion Issued:
Record:

October 19, 1995

1 Volume, 2 Envelopes (Exhibits) , \

1 CERTIFY
CH'GiNAL
DISTRICT .
OF UTAH/g
CVTE:_/|

Transcripts. >QMO

COPY OF AN
THIRD
STATE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the November 22, 1995, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was deposited in the
United States mail to the parties listed below:
Samuel D. McVey
Randy T. Austin
Kirton & McConkie, P.C.
Attorneys at Law for Appellant
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
6 0 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004
Stephen G. Crockett
Steven E. McCowin
Wesley D. Felix
Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger & Peterson
Attorneys at Law for Appellee
170 South Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Steven L. Taylor
Attorney at Law for Appellee
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Dated this 22nd day of November, 1995.

BY

,
)eputy (£Ierk

Case No. 940695-CA
TRIAL COURT:

Third District Court, SL County #930901471 CV
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land v. Horbach
ket No:
». Type:
Agency:
Status:

941695
Docket Date: 11/16/1994
Civil Appeal
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
Closed

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Gburt;

Case : 93090l9»l

rtr^fsjd-fl

C. England - Appellant
SAMUEL D. MCVEY ( KIRTON & MCCONKIE )
RANDY T. AUSTIN ( KIRTON & MCCONKIE )
ene Horbach - Appellee
STEVEN G. CROCKETT ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY }
STEVEN L. TAYLOR ( MABEY & COOMBS, L.C. )
icode Incorporated - Appellee
STEVEN G. CROCKETT ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY )
STEVEN E. MCCOWIN ( ATTORNEY AT LAW )
WESLEY D. FELIX ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY )
06/09/1994

Notice of Appeal Filed

06/23/1994
Default Letter Sent
t have notice re transcript filed within 10 days.
06/30/1994
Transcript Request Received
a Bennett, reporter. Dated June 30th. Unidentified dates
06/30/1994

Docketing Statement Filed

07/07/1994
Ack. of Request for Transcript
a Bennett received request July 1st. Will file Aug. 1st
07/13/1994
Extension of Time for Summ. DiGranted
07/13/1994 RCH
ellee's stipulated motion to July 27th to file motion
summary disposition
07/21/1994
Extension of Time for Summ. DiGranted
07/26/1994 RCH
ellee's ex parte motion for enlargement to 4 days after
eipt of transcript to file motion for summary disp.
08/09/1994
Notice of Transcript Filed in
a Bennett filed transcript Aug. 5th.
08/11/1994

Motion-Appellee-Summary DisposDenied

10/04/1994

38/18/1994
Extension of Time-Misc.
Granted
08/19/1994 RCH
sllant's motion for 14-day extension to Sept. 7th to
a response to motion for summary disp.
39/07/1994
Opposition to Motion
Drandum of points and authorities in opposition to
ellee's motion for summary affirmance.

^ a

%f

'i^k^y

10/04/1994
Motion-Appellee-Summ Disp Deni
rties should proceed to the next step in the appeal
ocess because uhe time is no longer suspended under RIO.
11/14/1994

Transfer to CA per Sec 78

11/16/1994
Received from Supreme Court(po
ad copy of cost bond. Need copy of record in dex to
t briefing.
11/22/1994

Cost Bond

12/08/1994
Record Index Filed-With Transc
Dellant's brief is due Jan. 20, 1995.
01/20/1995

Appellant's Brief Filed

02/21/1995

Appellee's Brief Filed

03/23/1995

Appellant's Reply Brief Filed

06/14/1995
Called for Record
Lked to Becki. Will send record.
c CS. Briefing is complete.
06/19/1995
Record Filed - Civil
JOL pleading, 1 VOL 8/5/93; 1 VOL 11/18/93; 2 VOLs 3/22/94
1 2 ENVs exhibits.
08/03/1995
Calendared
E>s. September 19 at 9:30.
09/19/1995
Submitted on Oral Argument
De 484; App 4193; Ape 4829; Rebut 5712
10/19/1995
Opinion Filed
/ersed and Remanded. Opinion by J. Billings; JJ's Orme
i Bench concur.
11/22/1995
Remitted
Exhibits, 2 Volumes and 4 Transcripts sent to 3rd Judicial
strict Court, Salt Lake County, Utah
11/24/1995
Cert. Filed - Supreme Court
rt. filed in the Supreme Court on November 20,, 1995.
02/15/1996
Notice- Writ of Cert Granted i
:ed February 13, 1996.
Dreme Court Case No. 950506.
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OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION
P O. BOX 25060
SANTA ANA, CA 92799

ATTN: QUALITY CONTROL

Loan Number*
011012535
Servicing Number: 928275-7
_fSpace Above This line For Rcconfing DataL

DEED OF TRUST
THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Security InstrumentB) is made on
May 24 , 1996
LAN C. ENGLAND, A MARRIED MAN AS HIS SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY

The trustor is

("Borrower").
The trustee is

F I R S T AMERICAN T I T L B OF UTAH

("Trustee"). The beneficiary is

OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

which is organized and existing under the laws of
2 02 0 EAST F I R S T STREET

A CALIFORNIA

CORPORATION

CALIFORNIA
SUITE 1 0 0 ,

and whose address is

SANTA ANA,

CA

92 705

("Lender").

Borrower owes Lender the principal sum of

FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
. . . AND NO/lOOTHs
Dollars (U S. $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
).
This debt is evidenced by Borrower's note dated the same date as this Secunty Instrument ("Note"), which provides for monthly
payments, with the full debt, if not paid earlier, due and payable on
June 0 1 , 2026
. This Security
Instrument secures to Lender: (a) the repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note, with inteiest, and all renewals, extensions
and modifications of the Note; (b) the payment of all other sums, with interest, advanced under paragraph 7 to protect the security
of this Secunty Instrument; and (c) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and
the Note. For this purpose. Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following
described property located in
S a l t Lake
County, Utah:
LOTS 1 THROUGH 8, INCLUSIVE, OF BLOCK 3, GENEVA PLACE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT
THEREOF, FILED IN BOOK C OF PLATS, AT PAGE 90 OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY
RECORDER.

which has the address of
Utah
84107

2157

SOUTH LINCOLN STREET,

SALT LAKE

CITY

[Street, City),

("Property Address");

[Zip Code)

TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances,
and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property All replacements and additions shall also be covered by this Security
Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the "Property."
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to grant
and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and wdl
defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record.
COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:
1. Payment of Principal and Interest; Prepayment and Late Charges. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal
of and interest on the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment and late charges due under the Note.
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2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or to a written waiver by Lender, Borrower shall pay to
Lender on the day monthly payments are due under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum ("Funds") for: (a) yearly taxes
and assessments which may attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien on the Property; (b) yearly leasehold payments
or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) yearly hazard or property insurance premiums; (d) yearly flood insurance premiums,
if any; (e) yearly mortgage insurance premiums, if any; and ( 0 any sums payable by Borrower to Lender, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 8, m lieu of the payment of mortgage insurance premiums. These items are called "Escrow hems.'' Lender
may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the maximum amount a lender for a federally related mortgage
loan may require for Borrower's escrow account under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 as amended from
time to time, 12 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq. ("RESPA"), unless another law that applies to the Funds sets a lesser amount. If so,
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the lesser amount. Lender may estimate the amount
of Funds due on the basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise m
accordance with applicable law.
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity
(including Lender, if Lender is such an institution) or in any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the
Escrow Items. Lender may not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing the escrow account, or
verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and applicable law permits Lender to make such
a charge. However, Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for an independent real estate tax reporting service used
by Lender in connection with this loan unless applicable law provides otherwise. Unless an agreement is made or applicable law
requires interest to be paid, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and
Lender may agree in writing, however, that interest shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge,
an annual accounting of the Funds, showing credits and debits to the Funds and the purpose for which each debit to the Funds was
made. The Funds are pledged as additional security for all sums secured by this Security Instrument.
If the Funds held by Lender exceed the amounts permitted to be held by law, Lender shall account to Borrower for the
excess Funds in accordance with the requirements of applicable law. If the amount of the Funds held by Lender at any time is not
sufficient to pay the Escrow Items when due, Lender may so notify Borrower in writing, and, in such case Borrower shall pay to
Lender the amount necessary to make up the deficiency. Borrower shall make up the deficiency in no more than twelve monthly
payments, at Lender's sole discretion.
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower any Funds
held by Lender. If, under paragraph 2 1 , Lender shall acquire or sell the Property, Lender, prior to the acquisition or sale of the
Property, shall apply any Funds held by Lender at the time of acquisition or sale as a credit against the sums secured by this
Security Instrument.
3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under paragraphs
1 and 2 shall be applied: first, to any prepayment charges due under the Note; second, to amounts payable under paragraph 2; third,
to interest due; fourth, to principal due; and last, to any late charges due under the Note.
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines and impositions attributable to the Property
which may attain priority over this Security Instrument, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any. Borrower shall pay these
obligations in the manner provided in paragraph 2, or if not paid in that manner, Borrower shall pay them on time directly to the
person owed payment. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this paragraph. If
Borrower makes these payments directly, Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender receipts evidencing the payments.
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless Borrower: (a) agrees
in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to Lender; (b) contests in good faith the lien
by, or defends against enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in the Lender's opinion operate to prevent the
enforcement of the lien; or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this
Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which may attain priority over this
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or more
of the actions set forth above within 10 days of the giving of notice.
5. Hazard or Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property
insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage" and any other hazards, including floods or
flooding, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender
requires. The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's approval which shall not
be unreasonably withheld. If Borrower fails to maintain coverage described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage
to protect Lender's rights in the Property in accordance with paragraph 7'.
All insurance policies and renewals shall be acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage clause. Lender shall
have the right to hold the policies and renewals. If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid
premiums and renewal notices. In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender
may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower.
Vnltss Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, or applicable law otherwise requires, insurance proceeds shall
be applied first to reimburse Lender for costs and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining any such insurance proceeds, and
then, at discretion, and regardless of any impairment of security or lack thereof: (i) to the sums secured may determine in its sole
and absolute discretion; and/or (ii) to Borrower to pay the costs and expenses of necessary repairs or restoration of the Property
to a condition satisfactory to Lender. If Borrower abandons the Property, or does not answer within 30 days a notice from Lender
that the insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, Lender may collect the insurance proceeds. Lender may, in its sole and
absolute discretion, and regardless of any impairment of security or lack thereof, use the proceeds to repair or restore the Property
or to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. The 30-day period will begin when the notice is
given.
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or
postpone die due date of the monthly payments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount of the payments. If under
paragraph 21 the Property is acquired by Lender, Borrower's right to any insurance policies and proceeds resulting from damage
to the Property prior to ihe acquisition shall pass to Lender to the extent of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately
prior to the acquisition.
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If Borrower obtains earthquake insurance, any other hazard insurance, or any other msurance on the Property and such
insurance is not specifically required by Lender then such insurance shall (1) name Lender as loss payee thereunder, and (n) be
subject to the provisions of this paragraph 5
6 Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Borrower's Loan Application, Leaseholds Borrower shall
not destroy damage or impair the Property allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property Borrower shall
be in default if any forfeiture action or proceeding, whether civd or criminal, is begun that in Lender s good faith judgment could
result in forfeiture of the Property or otherwise materially impair the hen created by this Security Instrument or Lender s security
interest Borrower may cure such a default and reinstate, as provided in paragraph 18 by causing the action or proceeding to be
dismissed wiih a ruling that in Lender s good faith determination precludes forfeiture of the Borrower s interest in the Property
or other material impairment of the hen created by this Security Instrument or Lender s security interest Borrower shall also be
in default if Borrower during the loan application process, gave materially false or inaccurate information or statements to Lender
(or failed to provide Lender with any material information) m connection with the loan evidenced by the Note, including, but not
limited to representations concerning Borrower s occupancy of the Property as a principal residence If this Security Instrument
is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the
leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the merger in writing
Borrower shall at Borrower s own expense, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the Property
or any portion thereof or Borrower s title thereto, the validity or priority of the lien created by this Security instrument, or the rights
or powers of Lender or Trustee with respect to this Security Instrument or the Property All causes of action of Borrower, whether
accrued before or after the date of this Security Instrument, for damage or injury to the Property or any part thereof, or m
connection with any transaction financed m whole or m part by the proceeds of the Note or any other note secured by this Security
Instrument by Lender or in connection with or affecting the Property or any part thereof, including causes of action arising in tort
or contract and causes of action for fraud or concealment of a material fact, are, at Lender's option, assigned to Lender, and the
proceeds thereof shall be paid directly to Lender who, after deductmg therefrom all its expenses, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, may apply such proceeds to the sums secured by this Security Instrument or to any deficiency under this Security Instrument
or may release any monies so received by it or any part thereof, as Lender may elect Lender may, at its option, appear in and
prosecute in its own name any action or proceeding to enforce any such cause of action and may make any compromise or
settlement thereof Borrower agrees to execute such further assignments and any other instruments as from time to time may be
necessary to effectuate the foregoing provisions and as Lender shall request
7 Protection of Lender's Rights m the Property If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in
mis Security Instrument, or there is a legal proceeding that may significantly affect Lender's rights in the Property (such as a
proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture or to enforce laws or regulations), then Lender may do and pay
for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property Lender's actions may include
paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument, appearing m court, paying reasonable attorneys'
fees and entering on the Property to make repairs Although Lender may take action under this paragraph 7, Lender does not have
to do so
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this paragraph 7 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security
Instrument Unless Borrower and Lender agree to other terms of payment, these amounts shall bear interest from the date of
disbursement at the Note rate in effect from time to time and shall be payable, with interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower
requesting payment
8 Mortgage Insurance If Lender required mortgage insurance as a condition of making the loan secured by this Security
Instrument Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the mortgage insurance in effect If, for any reason, the mortgage
insurance coverage required by Lender lapses or ceases to be in effect, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage
substantially equivalent to the mortgage msurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of
the mortgage insurance previously m effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer approved by Lender If substantially equivalent
mortgage insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall pay to Lender each month a sum equal to one twelfth of die yearly
mortgage insurance premium being paid by Borrower when the insurance coverage lapsed or ceased to be in effect Lender will
accept, use and retain these payments as a loss reserve in lieu of mortgage insurance Loss reserve payments may no longer be
required, at the option of Lender, if mortgage msurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided
by an insurer approved by Lender again becomes available and is obtained Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain
mortgage msurance in effect or to provide a loss reserve, until the requirement for mortgage insurance ends in accordance with
any written agreement between Borrower and Lender or applicable law
9 Inspection Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property Lender shall give
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to an inspection specifying reasonable cause for the inspection
10 Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection with any
condemnation or other taking of any part of the Property, or for conveyance in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall
be paid to Lender Lender may apply, use or release the condemnation proceeds in the same manner as provided in paragraph 5
hereof with respect to insurance proceeds
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the condemnor offers to make
an award or settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender
is authorized to collect and apply the proceeds, at its option, either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured
by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree m writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or
postpone the due date of the monthly payments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount of such payments
11 Borrower Not Released, Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver Extension of the time for payment or modification of
amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender to any successor in interest of Borrower shall not
operate to release the liability of the original Borrower or Borrower s successor m interest Lender shall not be required to
commence proceedings against any successor in interest or reruse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of
the suras secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or Borrower's successors
in interest Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any
right or remedy

hut s%^x*r
Page 3 of 6

!mt

Injt

Init

Init

hut
UTD10013 (04-^5 96)

12 Successors and Assigns Bound, Joint and Several Liability, Co-signers The covenants and agreements of this Security
Instrument shall bind and benefit ihe successors and assigns of Lender and Borrower, subject to the provisions of paragraph 17
Borrower s covenants and agreements shall be joint and several Any Borrower who co signs this Security Instrument but does not
execute the Note (a) is co signing this Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey that Borrower s interest in the
Property under the terms of this Security Instrument, (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security
Instrument and (c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower may agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations
with regard to the terms of this Security Instrument or the Note without that Borrower' s consent
13 Loan Charges If the loan secured by this Security Instrument is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges,
and that law is finally interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the loan
exceed the permitted limits, then (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amoum necessary to reduce the charge to the
permitted limit, and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower
Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower
If a refund reduces principal, ihe reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge under the Note
14 Notices Any notice to Borrower provided for in this Security Instrument shall be given by delivering it or by mailing
it by first class mail unless applicable law requires use of another method The notice shall be directed to the Property Address or
any other address Borrower designates by notice to Lender Any notice to Lender shall be given by first class mail to Lender s
address stated herein or any other address Lender designates by notice to Borrower Any notice provided for in this Security
Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given as provided in this paragraph
15 Governing Law, Severability This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction
m which the Property is located In the event that any provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with
applicable law such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be given effect
without the conflicting provision To this end the provisions of this Security Instrument and the Note are declared to be severable
16 Borrower's Copy Borrower shall be given one conformed copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument
17 Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower If all or any part of the Property or any interest m it is
sold or transferred (or if a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred and Borrower is not a natural person) without
Lender s prior written consent, Lender may at its option, require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security
Instrument However this option shall not be exercised by Lender if exercise is prohibited by federal law as of the date of this
Security Instrument
If Lender exercises dns option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration The notice shall provide a penod of not
less man 30 days from the date the notice is delivered or mailed within which Borrower must pay ail sums secured by this Security
Instrument If Borrower fails to pay these sums pnor to the expiration of dns penod, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted
by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower
18 Borrower's Right to Remstate If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower shall have the right to have enforcement
of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time pnor to the earlier of (a) 5 days (or such other penod as applicable law may
specify for reinstatement) before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security Instrument or (b)
entry of a judgment enforcing this Secunty Instrument Those conditions are that Borrower (a) pays Lender all sums which then
would be due under this Secunty Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other
covenants or agreements, (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorneys fees, and (d) takes such iction as Lender may reasonably require to assure that the lien of this Security
Instrument, Lender's rights in the Property and Borrower s obligation to pay the sums secured by this Secunty Instrument shall
continue unchanged Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this Security Instrument and the obligations secured hereby shall remain fully
effective as if no acceleration had occurred However, this nght to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under
paragraph 17
19 Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer The Note or a partial interest m the Note (together with this Secunty
Instrument) may be sold one or more times without pnor notice to Borrower A sale may result m a change in the entity (known
as the "Loan Servicer") that collects monthly payments due under the Note and this Secunty Instrument There also may be one
or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be
given wntten notice of the change in accordance with paragraph 14 above- and applicable law The notice will state the name and
address of the new Loan Servicer and address to which payments should bemade The notice will also contain any other information
required by applicable law The holder of the Note and this Security Instrument shall be deemed to be the Lender hereunder
20 Hazardous Substances. Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any
Hazardous Substances on or in the Property Borrower shall not do, nor allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property
diat is in violation of any Environmental Law The preceding two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the
Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropnate to normal residential uses and
to maintenance of the Property
Borrower shall promptly give Lender wntten notice of any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or other action by any
governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law
of which Borrower has actual knowledge If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority, that any
removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all
necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law
Borrower shall be solely responsible for shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Lender, its directors, officers,
employees, attorneys, agents, and their respective successors and assigns, from and against any and all claims, demands, causes
of action, loss, damage, cost (including actual attorneys' fees and court costs and costs of any required or necessary repair, cleanup
or detoxification of the Property and the preparation and implementation of any closure, abatement, containment, remedial or other
required plan), expenses and liability directly or indirectly ansmg out or or attnbutable to (a) the use, generation, storage, release,
threatened release discharge, disposal, abatement or presence of Hazardous Substances on, under or about the Property (b) the
transport to or from the Property of any Hazardous Substances (c) die violation of any Hazardous Substances law and (d) any
Hazardous Substances claims
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As used in (his paragraph 20, "Hazardous Substances' are those substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances by
Environmental Law and the following substances gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides
and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials As used in this paragraph
20, Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of tbe jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety
or environmental protection
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows
21 Acceleration, Remedies If any installment under the Note or notes secured hereby is not paid when due, or if Borrower
should be in default under any provision of this Security Instrument, of if Borrower is in default under any other deed of trust or
other instrument secured by the Property, aU sums secured by this Security InstrumeDt and accrued interest thereon shall at once
become due and payable at the option of Lender without prior notice, except as otherwise required by applicable law, and regardless
of any prior forbearance In such event, Lender, at its option, and subject to applicable law, may then or thereafter invoke the power
of sale and/or any other remedies or take any other actions permitted by applicable law Lender will collect all expenses mcuned
in pursuing the remedies described in this Paragraph 21, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title
evidence
If the power of sale is invoked, Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of the
election to cause tbe Property to be sold and shall record such notice in each county in which any part of the Property is located.
Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the manner prescribed by applicable law to Borrower and to the other persons
prescribed by applicable law Trustee shall give public notice of the sale to the persons and in the manner prescribed by applicable
law After the time required by applicable law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower, shall sell tbe Property at public auction to
the highest bidder at the time and place and under the terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order
Trustee determines Trustee may in accordance with applicable law, postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public
announcement at the time and place of any previously scheduled sale Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale.
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any covenant or warranty, expressed
or implied The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall
apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable
Trustee's and attorneys' fees, (b) to all sums secured by this Security histrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally
entitled to it or to the county clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
22 Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey
the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to
Trustee Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty and without charge to the person or persons legally entitled to it
Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs.
23. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor imstee to any
Trustee appointed hereunder Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and
duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by applicable law
24. Request for Notices Borrower requests that copies of the notices of default and sale be sent to Borrower's address
which is tbe Property Address.
25. Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure. Borrower has made certain written representation and disclosures in order to
induce Lender to make the loan evidenced by the Note or notes which this Security Instrument secures, and in the event that
Borrower has made any material misrepresentation or failed to disclose any material fact, Lender, at its option and without prior
notice or demand, shall have the right to declare the indebtedness secured by this Security Instrument, irrespective of tbe maturity
date specified in the Note or notes secured by this Security Instrument, immediately due and payable To the extent permitted by
applicable law, Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Lender setting forth facts showing a default by Borrower
under this paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder
26. Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence in the performance of each provision of this Security Instrument.
27. Waiver of Statute of I .imitations. The pleading of the statute of limitations as a defense to enforcement of this Security
Instrument, or any and all obligations referred to herein or secured hereby, is hereby waived to the fullest extent permitted by
applicable law
28. Modification This Security Instrument may be modified or amended only by an agreement in writing signed by
Borrower and Lender
29. Reimbursement. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall reimburse Trustee and Lender for any and
all costs, fees and expenses which either may incur, expend or sustain in the execution of the trust created hereunder or in the
performance of any act required or permitted hereunder or by law or in equity or otherwise arising out of or in connection with
this Security Instrument, the Note, any other note secured by this Security Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower
m connection with the Note or Security Instrument To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall pay to Trustee and
Lender their fees in connection with Trustee and Lender providing documents or services arising out of or in connection with this
Security Instrument, the Note, any other note secured by this Security Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower
m connection with tbe Note or Security Instrument
30 Clerical Error In the event Lender at any time discovers that the Note, any other note secured by this Security
Instrument, the Security Instrument, or any other document or instrument executed in connection with the Security Instrument, Note
or notes contains an error that was caused by a clerical mistake, calculation error, computer malfunction, printing error or similar
error, Borrower agrees, upon notice from Lender, to reexecute any documents that are necessary to correct any such error(s).
Borrower further agrees that Lender will not be liable to Borrower for any damages incurred by Borrower that axe directly or
indirectly caused by any such error
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31. Lost Stolen, Destroyed or Mutilated Security Instrnment and Other Documents. In the event of the loss, theft or
destruction of the Note, any other note secured by this Secunty Instrument, the Secunty Instrument or any other documents or
instruments executed in connection with the Secunty Instrument, Note or notes (collectively, the "Loan Documents"), upon
Borrower's receipt of an indemnification executed in favor of Borrower by Lender, or, in the event of the mutilation of any of the
Loan Documents, upon Lender's surrender to Borrower of the mutilated Loan Document, Borrower shall execute and deliver to
Lender a Loan Document in form and content identical to, and to serve as a replacement of, the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated
Loan Document, and such replacement shall have the same force and effect as the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated Loan
Documents, and may be treated for all purposes as the original copy of such Loan Document.
32. Assignment of Rents. As additional security hereunder, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender the rents of the Property
Borrower shall have the right to collect and retain the rents of the Property as they become due and payable provided Lender has
not exercised its nghts to require immediate payment m full of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and Borrower has not
abandoned the Property.
33. Riders to this Security InstrnmenL If one or more riders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this
Security Instrument, the covenants and agreements of each such rider shall be incorporated into and shall amend and supplement
the covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument as if therider(s)were a part of this Security Instrument.
[Check applicable box(es)]
B Adjustable Rate Rider

LJ Condominium Rider

a

LJ NO Prepayment Penalty Option Rider

LI Planned Unit Development Rider

12L) Occupancy Rider

1-4 Family Rider

CD Others) (specify)

BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Security Instrument and
in any rider(s) executed by Borrower and recorded with it.
Witnesses:

JSeai)

jSeaJ)

-Borrower

JSeaJ)

c.

JSeal)

Borrower

ENG:

(Seal)

(Seal)
-Borrower

-Borrower

STATE OF UTAH,

County ss

cif-ufe

The foregoing instrument was subscribed and sworn to and acknowledged before me diis

My Commission Expires:

/

Sy

Wt

y^l
Notary ]
ResioW>*r
NctaryPubto
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his duty to disclose material facts to them, under which buyer was to pay seller $25,000
namely, the fact that he had committed mal- as final amount owed for shares The Third
practice, by producing Dr. Baughman's depo- District Court, Salt Lake County, J Dennis
sition in which he states that he did not Frederick, J ,
dismissed complaint on
believe and does not believe that he commit- grounds that accord and satisfaction lacked
ted malpractice
consideration, and seller appealed
The
Jensen and Hlpwell, however, as the non- Court of Appeals, 905 P 2d 301, reversed and
moving parties, utterly failed to meet their remanded Certiorari was granted The Suburden of coming forward with evidence to preme Court, Durham, J., held that* (1)
contradict Dr Baughman's deposition testi- Court of Appeals erred by accepting trial
mony
In their opposition to McKay-Dee's court's fact finding that parties were mutualmotion for summary judgment, Jensen and
ly mistaken in concluding that $25,6*00 was
HipwelJ simply reiterate the allegations of
owed on contract, and then determining that
their complaint and provide no support for
their claim that Dr Baughman failed to feell amount due was uncertain, as required for
accord and satisfaction to apply, and (2) failthetn that Shelly had been "left to bleed
internally for several hours before accurately ure to object at trial precluded challenge to
diagnosing her illness " Dr Baughman's de- trial court'B allowance of counterclaim by
position testimony specifically and directly buyer, alleging overpayment of $169,501.75.
challenges Jensen and Hipwell's assertion,
Court of Appeals' judgment reversed;
and they failed to provide any evidence to
support their claim
Thus, the trial court trial court's judgment reinstated.
correctly ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to submit the matter to a jury.
Because J e n s e n and Hipwell's claim of con1. Appeal and E r r o r <s=>842(2), 1083(1)
structive fraud against McKay-Dee was insufficiently supported by the evidence, such a
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's
claim cannot be used to toll the statute of conclusions of law for correctness, and likelimitations on their medical malpractice wise Supreme Court accords no particular
claims against McKay-Dee
deference to conclusions of law made by
We remand to the trial court for further Court of Appeals, but reviews such conclusions for correctness
proceedings consistent with this opinion
2. Appeal and E r r o r <s=»1008.1(5)

L n n C. ENGLAND, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
E u g e n e H O R B A C H , an individual, Medicode, I n c , a Utah corporation, and Does
I t h r o u g h V, Defendants and Petitioners.
No. 950506.
Supreme Court of Utah
May 30, 1997
Rehearing Denied Aug 26, 1997
Seller of stock sued buyer, seeking to
enforce accord and satisfaction agreement

Court of Appeals may reverse factual
finding of trial court only if it determines
that finding is "clearly erroneous," that is, if
trial court'B ruling contradicts great weight
of evidence or if court reviewing evidence is
left with definite and firm conviction that
mistake has been made
Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 52(a)
See publication Words and Phrases
for other Judicial constructions and definitions

tain as to amount owing on contract, so as to
allow buyer's payment of $25,000 to seller to
operate as accord and satisfaction; Court of
Appeals was bound by trial court's factual
determinations unless findings were "clearly
erroneous/ and no such determination was
made In present case Rules Civ P r o c , Rule
52(a)
S

4. Accord and Satisfaction <5 »10(1)
Absence of uncertainty as to amount due
under contract'for sale of shares of corporation precluded determination by court of appeals that payment of $25,000 by buyer to
seller was an accord and satisfaction; trial
court found mutual mistake present, under
which parties concluded with certainty, albeit
mistakenly, that $25,000 of purchase price
remained unpaid.

DURHAM, Justice:
This case comes to us on a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals, which held that the
parties had reached an accord and satisfaction of their dispute. We reverse
In 1989, defendant Eugene Horbach orally
agreed to buy 258,363 shares of Medicode
stock from plaintiff Lan England at $2 75 per
share, for a total purchase price of $710,498 25
Over the course of the next ten
months, Horbach made several payments to
England totaling $859,599 35 Taking into
account a reimbursement of $4,599 35 for
certain additional expenses that England had
incurred on Horbach's behalf, by September
14, 1990, Horbach had in fact overpaid England by $144,501.75.

5. Pleading «=»230(5)

Nevertheless, when the parties met again
eight months later, on May 23, 1991, both

While trial court has only limited discretion to grant amendment of pleadings to
conform to evidence adduced at trial, as it
must first find that presentation of merits of
action will be subserved by amendment and
that admission of evidence, In question would
not prejudice adverse party in maintaining
his action or defense on merits, thereafter
trial court has full discretion to allow ah
amendment of the pleadings; that is, it may
grant or deny party's motion for amendment
upon any reasonable basis, and court's decision can be reversed only if abuse of discretion appears. Rules Civ P r o c , Rule 15(b)

were apparently under the mistaken impression that more money was owed on the original contract. Horbach, because of errors he
attributes to his accounting department, was
uncertain of the amount then due England
testified that he thought Horbach owed him
an amount between $25,000 and $75,000
But England also testified that he told Horbach that the amount owed was $25,000
Horbach believed England, and the trial
court Tovnd that "at the May 23rd meeting
both the Plaintiff and the Defendant mistakenly believed that $25,000 remained owing
under the 19R9 stock purchase agreement"

6. Pleading <s~411
Failure to object at trial precluded challenge to trial court's allowance during trial of
counterclaim by buyer of stock, alleging he
had overpaid by $169,501.75, after trial court
found that agreement under which buyer was
to pay seller an additional $25,000 was founded on mutual mistake and was unenforceable

3. Appeal and E r r o r <£=*1094(1)
Court of Appeals erred by purporting to
accept trial court's factual determination that
parties to sale of stock mistakenly believed
that buyer owed 6eller an additional $25,000,
and then concluding that parties were uncer-

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Samuel D. McVey, Randy T Austin, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent
Steven G. Crockett, Steven E. McCowin,
Wesley D. Felix, Steven L. Taylor, Salt Lake
City, for defendants and petitioners.

Consequently, on May 23, 1991, the parties
came to an agreement (the "May 23 agreement") whereby England delivered the 258,363 shares to Horbach and Horbach gave
England a post-dated check for $25,000 along
with a note promising to "hold 2% of Medicode stock in trust for you (Englandl forever
unless I have different instructions by you on
disposition of that stock " But when England later asked Horbach to reconvey the
promised two percent of Medicode stock,
Horbach reftised
Horbach argued at trial
that he meant to deliver only a security
interest In the two percent to secure pay
ment of the postdated check and that the
language of the agreement was merely "an
unfortunate choice of language," possibly re-
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suiting from the fact that "we had a few
drinks at lunch." England brought an action
in the Third District Court to recover the
proceeds of the shares, which by stipulation
of the parties had been sold for $869,140 60
Horbach raised a counterclaim at the trial for
recovery of $169,6df.75, the amount that he
had overpaid on the original contract.
The trial court found that the May 23
agreement was executed under a mutual mistake of fact and was therefore unenforceable.
Because Horbach had already overpaid England by the time of the May 23 agreement,
the court found that England had a preexisting duty to deliver the shares to Horbach.
The court therefore concluded that Horbach's promise to give England an Interest In
twu percent of the Medicode stock was without consideration
The court also granted
Horbach's motion fof a counterclaim and
awarded him a judgment against England in
the amount of $169,601.75 for overpayments
under the original contract.
The court of appeals reversed the trial
court
England v Horbach, 905 P 2 d 301
(Utah C t A p p 1995). The court of appeals
found that the May 23 agreement constituted
an accord and satisfaction and found consideration for the agreement in the bargainedfor settlement of the parties' uncertain
claims. Id at 304. The court Stated that "if
the parties in good faith believe there is a
disputed or uncertain claim, mere settlement
of the amount due and acceptance of that
amount constitutes the consideration necessary to support the contract " Id (citations
omitted) As for the trial court's finding of
mutual mistake, the court of appeals recogfi)7ed that "the parties were indeed mistaken
thaf additional money was owed under the
original agreement
However," the court
continued, "this mistake did not go to the
terms of the parties' accord; rather it merely
demonstrates their accord WRS Indeed a compromise of a bona fide dispute which WHS not
necessarily well-founded, but was In good
faith " Id at 305 (citations omitted) This
court granted Horbach's'petition for certiorari 913 P 2d 749 (Utah 1996).
The petition foi certiorari and the briefs of
the parties indicate that we must resolve at
least three issues
"We must first decide

whether the court of appeals applied the
correct standard of review and gave proper
deference to the trial courf B findings of fact
Next we must determine whether the May 23
agreement was a compromise of an unsettled
claim constituting an accord and satisfaction
or merely the conclusion of the original contract based on mistaken assumptions about
the parties' legal obligations If the May 23
agreement did in fact constitute an accord
and satisfaction, we must also decide whether
the parties' mutual mistake merely goes to
the terms of the original agreement or
whether it invalidates any further "accord"
the parties may have reached on May 23.
Finally, we must decide whether the trial
court erred in granting Horbaeh'9 motion to
amend his pleading to conform to the evidence, thus allowing Horbach to counterclaim
for overpayments to England in the amount
of $169,501.75.
I.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW B E F O R E
T H E COURT OF APPEALS AND
T H E S U P R E M E COURT

[1,2] The court of appeals reviews the
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, and likewise this court "accordOJ no
particular deference to conclusions of law .
made by
the court of appeals, but review[8] such conclusions for correctness."
Landes v Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127,
1129 (Utah 1990). The court of appeals may
reverse a factual finding of the trial court
only if it determines that the finding is
"clearly erroneous," Utah R Civ P 52(a),
that is, If the trial court's '"ruling contradicts
the great weight of evidence or if a court
reviewing the evidence is left with 'a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made ' " Sevy v Security Title Co, 902 P.2d
629, 635 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v Walker, 743 P 2 d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This
court must determine in its turn "whether
the court of appeals correctly decided that
the trial court's ruling on this Issue was
clearly erroneous." Id.
[3] Horbach argues that the court of appeals improperly set aside the trial court's
finding of fact 11, in which the trial court
states, "The Court finds that at the May 23rd
meeting both the Plaintiff and the Defendant
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mistakenly believed that $25,000 remained
owing under the 1989 stock purchase agreement." In fact, the court of appeals accepted
the trial court's finding that "at the May 1991
meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken
that additional money was owed under the
original agreement" England, 905 P 2d at
305. However, the court of appeals also
writes that "both parties were uncertain as to
the amount that remained owing on the original contract when they entered Into their
agreement" Id. This finding of uncertainty
clearly ignores or overrides the trial court's
finding that the parties were certain, though
mistaken, that Horbach owed England $25,000, and the court of appeals' finding can
therefore be upheld only if that court correctly decided that the trial court's finding of
fact 11 was clearly erroneous.
However, the court of Appeals never explicitly assigns error to the factual findings of
the trial court, but claims to be "(alccepting
the facts as found by the" trial court." Id
Likewise, England does not argue that the
trial court's finding of fact on this issue was
clearly erroneous or even that the court of
appeals found it to be clearly erroneous. Instead he argues that the court of appeals'
ruling is consistent wi£h the fact9 as found by
the trial court We disagree. If one accepts
the trial court's finding that both parties
believed $25,000 was owing on the original
agreement, one cannot also accept the court
of appeals' finding that the parties were uncertain of the amount owed. Thus, while the
court of appeals claims to be "[accepting the
facts as found by the trial court," it has
instead assumed facts contrary to those
found by the trial court, implicitly rejecting
the trial court's findings. The court of appeals errs in reversing a trial court's finding
of fact Unless such a finding is determined to
be clearly erroneous Sevy, 902 P.2d at 635
The court of appeals made no such determination, and England has not even argued,
much less shown, clear error in the trial
court's finding that Horbach executed the
May 23 agreement under the belief that he
owed England $25,000. We therefore conclude that the court of appeals erred insofar
as it relied on the assumption that both
parties were uncertain of the amount owed,
and we explicitly adopt the trial court's find-

ing that "at the May 28rd meeting both
[England] and f Horbach] mistakenly believed
that $25,000 remained owing under the 1989
stock purchase a g r e e m e n t "
II. WAS T H E MAY 23 A G R E E M E N T
AN ACCORD A N D SATISFACTION?
[41 We must next determine whether, accepting the facts as found by the trial court,
the court of appeals correctly found that the
May 23 agreement constituted an "accord
and satisfaction" agreement enforceable separately from the parties' original 1989 agreem e n t According to the rule cited by the
court of appeals, "[t]he elements of an accord
and satisfaction lnchide[] '(I) a bona fide
dispute \or uncertainty] over an unliquidated
amount; (11) a payment tendered In full settlement of the entire dispute; and (Hi) an
acceptance of the p a y m e n t ' " England, 905
P.2d at 303 (change in original) (quoting Estate Landscape <fc Snoiv Removal
Specialists,
Inc. v Mountain States Tel & Tel Co, 844
P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992) (citing Morton
Remodeling
v Jensen> 706 P 2 d 607, 609
(Utah 1985); Neiderkanter
Bvildeti & Dcv
Corp v Campbell, 824 P 2 d 1193, 1197 (Utah
C t A p p 1992))) In view of its finding that
the parties were uncertatn of the amount
owed under the original conbact, the ronri of
appeals concluded that theu May 23 i^reement was the result of a compromise between England and Horbach—a new ngipo
ment constituting an aocoid and satisfaction
Id, at 304.
The court of appeals then determined that
while the parties were both under tho mis
taken impression that money was still owed
on the contract, this mistake went lo the
terms of the original contract but did not
affect the terms of the new and ^epoiate
agreement—the accord and satisfaction—pntered into by the parties on May 2?, 1991.
Id\ at 305. The law of mutual mistake In this
state declares, " 'A mutual mistake occurs
when both parties, at the time of contracting,
share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their
bargain.'" Warner v Sirstins, 838 P 2d 666,
669 (Utah.Ct.App.1992) (quoting
Robert
Langston Ltd. v McQuarrie, 741 P 2d 554,
557 (Utah.CtApp.1987)). The court of ap-
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peals writes, "In the instant case, the parties
were mistaken as to facts relevant to the
original contract—whether money was then
due and owing—not as to a term underlying
the accord and satisfaction." England, 905
P 2d at 305 n 4 While a mutual mistake does
Invalidate only the agreement entered into in
reliance on the mistaken assumption, we do
not decide the correctness of the court of
appeals' legal conclusion that a mistake as to
the amount owed does not go to the terms of
an accord In satisfaction of that debt
Instead, we conclude that the court of appeals
misapplied this rule of law to the facts of the
present case.
Taking the facts as found by the trial
court, there could have been no accord and
satisfaction entered into on May 23, 1991,
because the first element of accord and satisfaction—the existence of a bona fide dispute
or
uncertainty
over
an
unliquidated
amount—was not present The trial court's
finding that both parties believed Horbach
owed England $25,000 precludes the possibility of a dispute over the amount owing and
forces us to conclude that any uncertainty
Horbach may have had was cleared up, before he signed the May 23 agreement, by
England's own statement that Horbach owed
him $25,000 Therefore, when Horbach executed the agreement he was certain, though
mistaken, of the amount he owed If there
was no dispute and no uncertainty, there
could have been no compromise and thus no
accord Accepting the facts as found by the
trial court, we must conclude that the May 23
agreement represented merely the conclusion of the parties' original contract, not a
new accoid in satisfaction of an uncertain
debt
T h e court of appeals' ultimate conclusion
that the parties' mistake went to the underlying agreement, not to their May 23, 1991,
accord and satisfaction, is based on a mischaractenVation of the trial court's findings
of fact
If we accept the facts as actually
found by the trial court, there could have
been no accord and satisfaction The parties
agreed that Horbach would pay England
$25,000 based on their mutual mistaken belief that Horbach owed England $25,000, not
as a compromise to satisfy an uncertain debt

ENGLAND 1\ HORBACH
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The trial court therefore correctly concluded
that "the May 23rd agreement was made
under a mutual mistake of fact which went to
its essence and, therefore, the putative
agreement is unenforceable " Horbach's additional promise to give England two percent
of the Medlcode stock must therefore be
treated either aft a gratuitous promise unsupported by consideration or, as Horbach suggests, as a promise to hold the stock as
security for payment on Horbach'B post-dated $25,000 check
In either case, we may
uphold the trial court's conclusion that "[a)ny
•concession extracted from [Horbach] by
[England] in the May 23rd alleged agreement lacks consideration and the agreement,
therefore, is unenforceable "
On appeal, England does not argue that
the trial court's factual finding was in error,
only that the common mistake of the parties
constitutes an "u n certainty" within the
meaning of the rule of accord and satisfaction. By blurring the distinction between
mistake and uncertainty, England tries to
make the trial court's facts fit within the
court of appeals' theory of the case. A mistake, however, is clearly different from an
uncertainty. In fact, one might argue that
making a mistake requires some degree of
certainty or at least some confidence that
one's assumptions are correct. England's
argument that the parties' mutual mistake
should constitute an uncertainty within the
rule of accord and satisfaction would effectively eliminate the doctrine of mutual mistake from contract law because any mutual
mistake could be called merely an uncertainty Such a broad definition of "uncertainty
is unwarranted by logic or precedent and
would require courts to enforce contracts in
ways that the parties could never foresee at
the time of contracting and that might even
be contrary to the intent of both parties.

appeals' decision to enforce that agreement
must therefore be reversed.
IV. DID T H E TRIAL COURT ERR IN
ALLOWING HORBACH'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR OVERPAYMENTS?
England argues finally that the trial Judge
abused his discretion in allowing Horbach to
amend his pleading to conform to the evidence at trial, thereby permitting Horbach's
counterclaim for overpayments Rule 15(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the
presentation of the merits of the action will
be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense
upon the merits.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b).
[5] The decision to permit amendment
under rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is subject to what we have called
conditional discretionary review See Langeland v Monarch Motors, Inc, 307 Utah Adv
Rep. 3, 4,
P.2d
,
(Dec. 31, 1996)
(applying conditional discretionary review to
Utah R. Civ. P 36(b)). The trial court's
discretion to grant amendment of the pleadings is conditioned on the satisfaction of two
preliminary requirements: a finding that the
presentation of the merits of the action will
be subserved by amendment and a finding
that the admission of such evidence would

not prejudice the adverse party in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. The

agreement. As such, the May 23 agreement

trial court has only limited discretion in making these preliminary findings, but once
these prerequisites are met, the trial court
has full discretion to allow an amendment of
the pleadings; that is, it may grant or deny a
party's motion for amendment upon any reasonable basis, and the court's decision can be
reversed only if abuse of discretion appears
Cf. id.

was premised on a mutual mistake of material fact and is unenforceable
The court of

[6] In this case, England argues convincingly that be was prejudiced in maintaining

Because there was no dispute between the
parties and no uncertainty in the parties'
minds at the time of the May 23 agreement,
that agreement cannot be characterized as an
"accord and satisfaction" but merely as the
conclusion of their original 1989 stock sales

his defense against Horbach's counterclaim
because of the lateness of the amendment
In Langeland^ this court held that "the factors most important to our finding of prejudice
include (I) the temporal proximity of
the amendment to the date of trial, and (li)
whether the party opposing amendment relied on the [pleadings! in such a way as to
detrimentally affect its ability to prepare its
case." Langeland at 8, at
In this
case, Horbach first mentioned his counter
claim in his trial memorandum and moved for
permission to amend his pleadings at the end
of the presentation of evidence. Prejudice
might l?e found in the fact that England had
no opportunity to prepare a response to the
counterclaim and no time to brief and ni gue
legal defenses such as waiver and estoppel,
and also m the fact that England waived his
right to a jury trial or rejected settlement
offers in reliance on his understanding thai
no countei claim would be pursued
However, the rule requires the t m l fouri
to consider prejudice only "[ilf evident o is
objected to at the t r i a l " Utah R Civ F
15(b). As his own brief states, "England
acknowledges that no objection was rnisod at
trial." Because England failed to object thp
trial court had full discretion to grant 01
deny Horbach's motion to amr»nd the pleid
ings and can be reversed only upon a finding
of abuse of discretion, that is, if "no 1 e n v i able basis" for the trial court's decision can
be found. Considering the trial court's find
ing that Horbach had overpaid England by
$169,501 75, the court's decision to allow Hor
bach's claim for that amount is reasonable
and does not constitute an abuse of its discretion
England suggests that the counterclitm
for overpayments that Horbach introduced i t
trial was intentionally kept hidden until the
day of trial and that allowing Horbach to
amend his pleadings at that late date will
encourage other litigants to keep counter
claims hidden until the eve of trial Howev
er, the trial court's decision is not likely to
have the precedential effect England fears
First, any real advantage a party might gain
by such surprise would constitute prejudice
within the meaning of rule 15(b), and if objected to at trial, the court would not have
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discretion to allow the amendment.
See
Utah R Civ P 16(b). Second, even In the
absence of prejudice the trial court's decision
to permit a rule 15(b) amendment is within
the discretion of the trial court and any such
"secret claims" would be lost if the trial
judge found any reasonable basis for denying
the motion
Litigants are adequately discouraged from
keeping their claims secret until the eve of
trial by Hie fact that the trial judge has full
discretion to deny late motions to amerld for
any reason and the knowledge that most
courts look on such motions with disfavor
and are not easily persuaded to grant them
Girard v Appleby, 660 P 2d 245, 248 (Utah
1983)
Even the most calculating litigants
are unlikely to risk losing their claim merely
In the hope of gaining some kind of advantage through the element of surprise This
is especially true when the potential advantage to be gained could be eliminated by
opposing counsel through an objection to the
introduction of the evidence at trial and a
showing that the amendment would prejudice
them in the presentation of the merits of
their action. The Rules of Civil Procedure
are sufficient to discourage litigants from
intentionally concealing counterclaims until
the eve of trial. We are not willing to furt h e r constrict the discretion of trial judges by
second guessing their judgment every time
an amendment to a party's pleadings is permitted
Because England failed to object to the
presentation of evidence of Horbach's counterclaim at trial, we conclude that the trial
court was within its discretion to permit Horbnch to amend his pleadings to conform to
the evidence introduced at trial
Taking the facts as the trial court found
them, we conclude that the court of appeals
erred in reversing the district court If on
May 23, 1991, the parties were convinced
that Horbach owed England $25,000, there
could have" been no accord and satisfaction,
because there was ho uncertainty or dispute
about the amount owed Although the facts
oh the record are somewhat ambiguous, England does not urge us to reexamine the trial
couit's findings of fact but merely tries to
make the trial court's facts fit within the

court of appeals' theory of the case. This is
an awkward fit at best and would require the
court to define "uncertainty" so as to include
"mistakes." This is not just a broad definition, it is a mlsdennitibn, and by conflating
the two terms, the court would also conflate
two doctrines, effectively subsuming the doctrine of mutual mistake within the theory of
accord and satisfaction
Such a change in
the common law is not justified by logic or by
equity, particularly considering that the result in this case would be to permit one party
to retain what appears to be an unjust enrichment of $169,501.75.
The judgment of the court of appeals is
reversed, and the trial com t judgment reinstated.
ZIMMERMAN, C J . , STEWART,
Associate C J , and HOWE and RUSSON,
JJ., concur.
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negligent to any extent Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals, 909 P 2 d 271, Orme,
T.J., reversed and remanded, holding that
trial court granted excessive number of peremptory challenges to defendants. Granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Zimmerman,
C.J., held that: (1) trial court should have
limited discretion in Its decisions with respect
to whether coparties may exercise "separate
sets of peremptory challenges; (2) there was
no substantial controversy between southbound motorist and his former employer so
as to warrant granting them separate sets of
peremptory challenges; (3) rule that prejudice is presumed when trial court grants one
side too many peremptory challenges remains good law; (4) rule requiring that coparties jointly exercise peremptory challenges unless substantial controversy exists
between tfiem does not deny those coparties'
rights to due process or equal protection
under Federal Constitution and does not violate provision in State Constitution requiring
uniform operation of lawB of a general nature; and (5) plaintiff waived objection to the
granting of separate set of peremptory challenges to city.
Decision* of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Russon, J., concurred in the result

Shirley CARRIER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba Stone
Carpets, William Roger Smith, and T h e
City of P l e a s a n t Grove, Defendants and
Petitioners.
No. 960118.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug 8, 1997.

Eastbound motorist who was injured In
collision with southbound motorist brought
negligence action against southbound motorist, company that employed him at time of
accident, and city. The Fourth District
Court, Utah County, Ray M. Harding, Sr., J.,
entered judgment on jury verdict holding
plaintiff 60 percent negligent, southbound
motorist 40 percent negligent, and city not

1. Certiorari ©»63.1
On certiorari, Supreme Courts reviews
decision of court of appeals, not of trial court
2. Certiorari <&=»64(1)
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews
court of appeals' decision for correctness and
gives its conclusions of law no deference.
3. Certiorari «»64(1)
Correctness of court of appeals' decision,
as determined by Supreme Court on certiorari review, depends initially upon whether it
applied appropriate standard of review to
trial court's decision.
4. Jury «=» 136(3)
In deciding whether coparties are entitled to separate sets of peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether a substantial controversy exists between
them; determination Is a mixed question of

Utah

34

346 (Ut*h 1997)

fact and law, requiring trial court first
make fact findings as to the nature of ai
controversy between coparties and then
determine whether those facts meet leg
standard of substantial contt overs y
Rtil
Civ.Proc, RU)P 47
5. Appeal and E r r o r <s=»94f>
Four factors should be considered
determining the appropriate grant of discr
tion to trial court in applying legal nil
complexity and variety of facts undpriyir
rule, extent of Supreme Court'* exponent
applying legal principle and its ability I
anticipate and articulate outeome-determin
tive factors, extent to which trial judge h?
observed facts relevant to application of th
law that cannot be adequately reflected i
record, and strength of any policy ronsidei
ations supporting narrow discretion
6. J u r y <s=>136(3)
Trial court should have limited dfarrt
tion in its decisions with respect to whethe
coparties may exercise separate sets of per
emptory challenges; on spectrum of disere
tion, running from de novo on the one hnn<
to broad discretion on the other, appropriat
discretion on this issue lies close to, althougl
probably not at, the de novo end
Rule
Civ.Proc, Rule 47
7. J u r y <*=>136(3)
Conflict between employer and formej
employee, as to whether company advisee
former employee to lie about collision involv
ing employee and company van on othei
driver did not constitute "Substantial contro
versy" so as to warrant granting separate
sets of peremptory challenges to employee
and employer in negligence action by other
driver; those defendants both asserted as
defense that plaintiff was more responsible
for causing accident than they, neither filed
cross-claim against the other, and theie was
no separate, related litigation between them
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 47.
See publication Words and Phrase
for other judicial constructions and definitions
8. J u r y <$=» 130(3)
Fact that employer and former employee were represented by separate counsel in
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTME
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, and MP
VENTURES, L.C.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO.010910255
v.
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
PRINCIPLE FUNDING CORPORATION
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his capacity
as Salt Lake County Sheriff,
Defendants.

This matter came before the above entitled court on plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. Having considered both of the parties' arguments as well as the relevant law, the Court
enters the following ruling granting plaintiffs motion.
In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part, that in
the Court of Appeals,
[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of
the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari."
The time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days from the entry of
the Court of Appeals' decision. In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on November 22, 1995, more
than thirty days later, the Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly
thereafter, on November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court.

Based upon this sequence of events, defendant contends that after remittitur the District Court
did not obtain proper jurisdiction and consequently could modify its judgment in accordance with
the instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for certiorari was only
granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the District Court and after the thirty day
waiting period had expired. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, it was defendant who was in
a better position to protect itself in this matter since defendant could have requested a stay of
execution of judgment pending its petition.
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is to be determined from the
date of reinstatement and does n d relate back to the original judgment. Cox Corp. v Vertin 754 P.2d
938 (Utah 1988)
This is the final Order of this Court, no further Order is necessary.

Dated this

&

BY THE COURT:

day of December, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010910255 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this _/VJ day of

/ V x i ^

Page 1 (last)

NAME
STEVEN W CALL
ATTORNEY DEF
79 SOUTH MAIN
P.O. BOX 4 5385
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841450385
RONALD G RUSSELL
ATTORNEY PLA
185 SOUTH STATE STE 1300
PO BOX 11019
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841470019

>££.
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Ronald C. Russell, Esq. (4134)
Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. (8496)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 3 1 2002
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

ctuinth
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP
VENTURES, L.C.,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION;
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff,

Civil No. 010910255PR
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

This matter came before the court for oral argument on December 3, 2001 on
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Ronald G. Russell appeared on behalf of
plaintiffs and Steven W. Call appeared on behalf of defendant Principal Funding
Corporation. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties submitted the matter to
the court for a final determination based on the facts established by the record. The
court took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision dated

December 10, 2001. Based on the record herein, the matters submitted, and the
arguments of counsel, the court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff MP Ventures, L.C. is the owner of certain real property located at

2157 South Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is more particularly described as

follows:
Lots 1 through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place,
according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at
Page 90 of the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder.
Said property is hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property."
2.

On or about April 18, 1994, a Judgment on a counterclaim was entered

against Lan C. England in the Third judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in
an action entitled Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV
(the "Horbach judgment").
3.

An appeal was taken from the Horbach Judgment and on October 19, 1995,

the Utah Court of Appeals filed an Opinion reversing the Horbach Judgment which
states, "we vacate the trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim. . . ."
England v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 301, 303 n.1 (Utah App. 1995). The Utah Court of
Appeals issued its Remittitur to the district court on November 22, 1995, which

2

Remittitur was docketed by the district court in Civil No. 930901471 CV on December 1,
1995.
4.

On November 20, 1995, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the

Utah Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. The
petition for a writ of certiorari is shown as Entry No. 1 on the Utah Supreme Court's
docket in case number 950506.
5.

On February 13, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court entered an order granting

the petition for a writ of certiorari and, by letter dated February 14, 1996 addressed tu
the Third Judicial District Court, requested that the district court prepare and transmit the
record to the Utah Supreme Court.
6.

On May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion on the

certiorari petition. That decision states, "The judgment of the court of appeals is
reversed, and the trial court judgment reinstated." England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340,
346 (Utah 1997).
7.

The Utah Supreme Court issued its Remittitur in case number 950506 on

October 1, 1997.
8.

While the petition for certiorari was pending, Lan England borrowed

$500,000 from Option One Mortgage Corporation secured by a Deed of Trust recorded
against the Subject Property on May 3 1 , 1996 as Entry No. 6371918, in Book 7412, at
Page 2835 of the official records of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder having Lan C.

3

England, as trustor, First American Title of Utah, as trustee, and Option One Mortgage
Corporation, as beneficiary (the "Option One Trust Deed").
9.

The Option One Trust Deed was foreclosed and on January 10, 2001, a

Trustee's Deed was recorded at the office of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder as
Entry No. 7797085, in Book 8414, at Page 8416 naming Chase Manhattan Bank as
grantee.
10.

Chase Manhattan Bank conveyed the Subject Property to Tim Linford. In

turn, Tim Linford conveyed the Subject Property to MP Ventures, L.C.
11.

Principal Funding Corporation is the assignee of the Horbach Judgment and

directed the Salt Lake County Sheriff to conduct a sheriff's execution sale of the Subject
Property.
12.

Plaintiffs brought this action seeking an order and decree from the court

declaring and decreeing that defendant Principal Funding Corporation does not hold a
judgment lien against the Subject Property and seeking to enjoin the sheriff's sale.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
13.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2), a judgment lien applies to the

judgment debtor's property "owned or acquired during the existence of the

4

judgment . . . ." The lien does not exist independently of the judgment and attaches to
the debtor's property only so long as the judgment exists.
14.

Because the judgment lien depends on the existence of the judgment, the

lien of the Horbach judgment ceased to exist when the judgment was vacated by the
Utah Court of Appeals.
15.

When the Utah Supreme Court later reinstated the Horbach Judgment, a

judgment lien once again arose, but the relevant judgment's priority is to be determined
from the date of reinstatement and oues not relate back to the original judgment. See
Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988).
16.

Defendant Principal Funding Corporation contends that after Remittitur from

the Utah Court of Appeals, the district court did not obtain jurisdiction and consequently
could not modify its judgment in accordance with the instructions of the Utah Court of
Appeals. The version of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in effect in 1985,
however, provided that "the remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the
expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari." The time for filing a
petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days from the entry of the Utah
Court of Appeals' decision. The Utah Court of Appeals properly issued its Remittitur
within thirty days after the entry of its decision.
17.

The filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme

Court did not automatically stay the effect of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision or the

5

Remittitur issued by the Utah Court of Appeals. A stay of the Remittitur pending
certiorari review could have been sought to stay the effect of the Utah Court of Appeals'
decision and maintain a judgment lien. See Utah R. App. P. 36(b); State v. Palmer. 802
P.2d 748 (Utah App. 1990). Because a stay was available upon posting a supersedeas
bond, as a matter of public policy, the rationale adopted by courts in other jurisdictions
holding that a reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of reinstatement should
also apply in Utah.
18.

Plaintiff are entitled to the entry of judgment as prayed in the Amended

Complaint, including a decree quieting title to the Subject Property and enjoining
defendants from causing an execution sale of the Subject Property.
DATED this

^f [ day of January, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Stephen L. Henrio<
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS T(p F(

Mu

Ronald Gl Russell, EsqNof
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY.
STATE OF UTAH. #
DATE:

Steven W. Call, Esq. of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant Principal Funding Corporation
'^TRtCt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 2h
day of December, 2001 a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT A N D CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed
postage prepaid, to:
Steven W. Call, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. (8496)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 3 1 2002
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

iqralh
©puty Clerk
Deputy CI

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP
VENTURES, L.C.,
FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION;
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff,

Civil No. 010910255PR
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based
thereon and the record in this matter,
00

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:

CO

1.

cn
cr»

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on

Count I of the Amended Complaint. The court hereby declares that defendant Principal

CO
-a
cn

cn
o
en

Funding Corporation does not hold a judgment lien against the following-described
property (the "Subject Property") arising from the Judgment entered in the action entitled
Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV, in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah and the court hereby quiets title to the Subject
Property in favor of plaintiff MP Ventures, L.C. and against defendant Principal Funding
Corporation. The Subject Property is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more
specifically described as follows:
Lots i through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, according
to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at Page 90 of
the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
(Tax identification number 16-20-136-006.)
2.

Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Principal

Funding Corporation on Count II of the Amended Complaint and defendant Principal
Funding Corporation is hereby enjoined and restrained from causing the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County to sell, attempt to sell, or to initiate any further proceedings to sell the
Subject Property pursuant to execution proceedings arising from a Judgment entered in
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in an action entitled Lan C.
England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No.930901471CV.
3.

Bond number 1162810 filed in this action by Old Republic Surety Company,
CO

as surety, dated November 26, 2001, is hereby released and discharged.
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en

CO

2
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O

4.

This judgment is a final order resolving all claims and causes of action in this

case and is, therefore, entered as the Final Judgment.
DATED this

& / day of January, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
District Court Judge

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1 CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY 0 AN OFiSlNAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY.

Steven W. Call, Esq. oi
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant Principal Funding Corporation
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